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ABSTRACT 
The dubious merger between the al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and Saudi Arabia in 
January 2009 quickly raised a “red flag” among U.S. policy makers in Washington.  The 
newly formed transnational terror group known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) spurred President Barack Obama to initiate a thorough review and reinvention of 
U.S. policy towards Yemen.  In response to the President’s initiative, the National 
Security Council (NSC) developed a “two pronged strategy,” which sought to strengthen 
Yemen’s security apparatus and improve its governance. The strategy is consistent with 
the administration’s overall perception of the vulnerabilities inherent in a weak state,  yet 
an investigation into the elements that define Yemen’s sociopolitical landscape, as well 
as an analysis of AQAP’s strategy, reveal that the U.S. strategy toward Yemen embraces 
inaccurate assumptions. This study finds that the rapid buildup of Yemen’s security 
apparatus prior to the implementation of government reforms has perpetuated the 
authoritarian rule within the country, further entrenching AQAP within the marginalized 
southern population.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Al Qaeda has used weak states as safe havens since its inception in 1988, and 
since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. has codified the significance of 
weak states in its most authoritative national strategies.  These strategies have proclaimed 
the intention to counter al Qaeda and its associated movements as they attempt to set up 
safe havens in the ‘ungoverned spaces’ inherent in weak states.  But since 2008, there has 
been a string of attacks by the al Qaeda affiliate in Yemen, including a coordinated attack 
against the U.S. embassy in Sana’a; links to the Ft. Hood shootings in Texas; the 
attempted bombing of flight 253 over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009; and most recently 
the attempted downing of cargo planes bound for the U.S.  So far, there has been a muted 
response to these attacks which have targeted the U.S. homeland.  The U.S. strategy 
toward weak states has maintained a resolute tone since 9/11; but since 2001, al Qaeda 
has become entrenched in Yemen.  How has the U.S. applied its weak state strategy 
toward Yemen?  Does the U.S. have an effective strategy to counter al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula? 
The dubious merger between the al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and Saudi Arabia 
in January 2009 quickly raised a ‘red flag’ among U.S. policy makers in Washington.  
The newly formed transnational terror group known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) spurred President Barack Obama to initiate a thorough review and 
reinvention of U.S. policy towards Yemen.1
                                               
1 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Yemen on the Brink:  Implications for U.S. Policy:  Hearing 
before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 2nd sess., 2010, 9. 
 In response to the President’s initiative the 
National Security Council (NSC) developed a “two pronged strategy” which sought to 
strengthen Yemen’s security apparatus, and improve its governance.  The strategy is 
consistent with the administration’s overall perception of the vulnerabilities inherent in a 
“weak state,” but the strategy itself does not provide a realistic or effective approach 
towards Yemen.  This study presents two propositions which replace the broad and 
idealistic assumptions present in the current strategy with a more applicable set of core 
assumptions based on both the sociopolitical landscape of Yemen and the known 
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strategies of AQAP.  In essence, this paper finds that the U.S. initiated buildup of 
Yemen’s security apparatus has far outpaced the implementation of governmental 
reforms, thus further entrenching AQAP within the marginalized southern population.  
Consequently, any strategy which aims to counter AQAP must place the tribal networks 
of southern Yemen as its Center of Gravity.  A focused effort on improving governance 
from the grassroots up in southern Yemen, along with a U.S. led counterterrorism effort 
which directly confronts the immediate threats from AQAP, would give the “two pronged 
strategy” the traction it needs to be effective.   
The strategy developed to counter AQAP in Yemen is the first application of a 
broader approach by the U.S. to deny safe havens to al Qaeda.  The principle tenant of 
this approach is to strengthen weak states in order to decrease the amount of ‘ungoverned 
spaces.’  This policy is alluded to in a majority of the published strategies which come 
from the Office of the President and the Department of Defense.2 The most recent and  
authoritative policy on weak states resides in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) 
which expands on denying al Qaeda safe havens in “at-risk” states.  The characteristics of 
this approach include, “information-sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and 
establishing new practices to counter evolving adversaries.”  It also states that the 
strategy is meant “to help states avoid becoming terrorist safe havens by helping them 
build their capacity for responsible governance and security through development and 
security sector assistance.”3
These broad and ambitious objectives are based on bold assumptions.  First, they 
assume that ‘at risk’ states actually want help in building responsible governance.  
Second, they assume that the governments of potential ‘safe havens’ would readily share 
information, or cooperate in law enforcement; thus presuming that the U.S. and the ‘at 
risk’ states share the same security priorities.  And finally, it assumes that the State is the 
proper center of gravity in the effort to counter al Qaeda.  These assumptions can also be 
   
                                               
2 The survey includes the 2010 National Security Strategy, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 
2008 National Defense Strategy, and 2004 National Military Strategy.  (2004 remains the latest edition of 
the NMS.) 
3 The White House, National Security Strategy (May, 2010), 21.  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed October 
20, 2010). 
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thought of as “conditions” for the strategy to be effective, and these conditions are not 
present in Yemen.  The NSC developed the new policy for Yemen based on the tenets of 
the “weak state strategy” residing within NSS, and they expect the assumptions to hold 
true.  Yet the assumptions within the weak state strategy do not accurately reflect the 
conditions in Yemen. 
A. TENETS OF THE WEAK STATE STRATEGY 
 The strategy crafted by the NSC in the spring of 2009 contains the trademarked 
assumptions associated with weak states.  The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) for 
example describes weak states as “fertile ground” for terrorists who thrive in 
“ungoverned spaces.”4  And former CENTCOM Commander General Anthony Zinni 
was quoted as describing the ungoverned spaces of weak states as “Petri dishes for 
extremism.”5  The strategy articulated by the NDS therefore asserts that in order to 
reduce extremism, the U.S. should strive to shrink the ungoverned spaces that are 
inherent in weak states.6  The way to shrink the ungoverned spaces as described by 
policy makers is to strengthen the State so that it can govern the ungoverned areas.  The 
consensus is for a “whole of government” approach which involves a multitude of 
government agencies, most notably the Departments of State and Defense; with the State 
Department focusing on governance and the Defense Department directing the security 
improvements.  This whole of government philosophy is present in the 2010 NSS which 
emphasizes building the capacities for governance and security in ‘at risk’ states.7
 
  These 
strategic documents elucidate on the dangers of ungoverned spaces within weak states, 
and emphasize the importance of State building to remedy the problem.  While the tenets 
of the weak state strategy sound plausible on paper, the application of the strategy may 
prove to be problematic. 
                                               
4 Office of the Secretary of Defense, National Defense Strategy (June, 2008), 3-8.  
http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf (accessed October 20, 2010). 
5 House Committee, Yemen on the Brink, 35. 
6 Office of the Secretary of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 8. 
7 The White House, National Security Strategy, 21. 
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Table 1.   U.S. Strategy to Deny al Qaeda Sanctuary in Weak States 
 
 5 
B. A CASE STUDY IN WEAK STATE TRATEGY 
The formation of AQAP in Yemen has given the U.S. its first opportunity to apply 
the weak state strategy outside the realm of combat operations.  Wartime reconstruction 
efforts certainly fit into the weak state approach, but they benefit from a colossal amount 
of resources and direct U.S. control.  Afghanistan in particular has been a war defined on 
denying safe haven to al Qaeda’s core; and the insurgency in Iraq has also created 
conditions for a potential terrorist safe haven as the government transitions to democracy.  
In both theaters of operation the U.S. has been able to proceed with strengthening the 
State through direct intervention, and the use of immense resources.  As of FY2011, the 
cumulative funding for efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan has been $1.3 trillion, with each 
operation employing over 100,000 troops at their peak.8
C. THE “TWO PRONGED STRATEGY” IN YEMEN 
 Yemen provides the first 
instance where a tangible threat from al Qaeda resides in a sovereign, ‘partner’ nation 
where the U.S. has neither the political control, nor the military resources to transform 
the State and pursue al Qaeda.  This study analyzes the current U.S. strategy towards 
Yemen as a case study in the implementation of the weak state approach as outlined in 
the NSS.  Furthermore it questions the validity of the strategy towards Yemen through an 
investigation of its underlying assumptions.  
The “two pronged strategy” for Yemen focuses on building the capacity for good 
governance, as well as a strengthened security apparatus, in order to counter AQAP.  
Specifically, the strategy consists of two elements:  First, to “strengthen the Government 
of Yemen’s ability to promote security and minimize the threat from violent extremists 
within its borders.  And second, to “mitigate Yemen’s economic crisis and deficiencies in 
government capacity, provision of services, transparency, and adherence to the rule of 
law.”  The strategy also notes that “as Yemen’s security challenges and its 
 
 
                                               
8  U.S. Library of Congress.  Congressional Research Service,  The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco, congressional Rep. RL33110, 
Wahsington:  The Service,  September 2, 2010, 1. 
 6 
social, political, and economic challenges are interrelated and mutually reinforcing, so 
U.S. policy must be holistic and flexible in order to be effective both in the short and long 
term.”9
1. The First Prong:  USCENTCOM and Building the Security 
Apparatus 
   
First and foremost, the NSC’s strategy toward Yemen consists of strengthening 
the security apparatus within that country.  Terrorist attacks on U.S. soil including the Ft. 
Hood shootings, the Christmas Day bombing attempt, and the more recent attempts to 
detonate packages onboard cargo planes over the East coast, have made Yemen’s internal 
security a matter of U.S. national security.  To strengthen U.S. security vis-à-vis Yemen’s 
security apparatus, USCENTCOM has taken the lead on building up Yemen’s border 
security and counterterrorism forces.  In the USCENTCOM posture statement given by 
General David Petraeus in March 2010, there are echoes of the NSS and NDS weak state 
strategy, along with the more targeted strategy toward Yemen as formulated by the NSC.  
In describing CENTCOM’s major activities, besides Afghanistan and Iraq, the posture 
statement lists the responsibilities of defeating “al-Qaeda and its Associated 
Movements,” as well as “denying sanctuaries and disrupting support for insurgent 
groups,” and with an overarching aim to “bolster at-risk states.”10But a more telling 
glimpse into the Yemen strategy, General Petraeus states that CENTCOM is tasked with 
helping “build Yemen’s security, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorist capabilities,” 
by nearly doubling the amount of U.S. security assistance in the coming year.11
                                               
9 Strategy as laid out by Jeffrey Feltman, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and 
Robert Godec, the Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism.  House Committee, Yemen on the 
Brink, 8–15. 
  And 
indeed the amount of security assistance funds jumped from $67 million in 2009, to 
10 Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of General David H. Petraeus before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command (March 16, 2010), 20. 
11 Ibid., 38. 
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$150 million in 2010.12
 Building Yemen’s security apparatus to meet the immediate threats posed by 
AQAP have centered on training and equipping security forces.  This is accomplished by 
U.S. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), which has up to 75 members 
training Yemeni counterterrorism forces, and additional personnel to run development 
initiatives in concert with USAID.
  Security assistance does not stop with material support however; 
training Yemeni counterterrorist forces has also become a priority. 
13
2. The Second Prong:  Building Governmental Capacity With USAID  
The funding, equipment, and training provided by 
the U.S. has given the government of Yemen and President Saleh an immediate boost in 
security capacity, while the effort to bring good governance is a more long term affair.  
 The second pillar of the NSC’s strategy toward Yemen has been undertaken by 
USAID, which provides a more detailed sub-strategy than in the security sector, and 
gives a more promising lean towards a grassroots approach to reform.  The organization’s 
overarching goal “is to increase Yemen’s stability through targeted interventions in 
vulnerable areas,” with the underlying hypothesis that, “addressing the development 
needs of underserved communities is causally related to improving political and social 
stability.”14 As laid out in their 2010–2012 Yemen Strategy, USAID takes a two tiered 
approach by (1) improving livelihoods in targeted communities, and (2) improving 
governance capacities to mitigate drivers of instability.15
                                               
12 A speech delivered by the Department of State’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Daniel 
Benjamin, U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen (8 September 2010) 
  The targeted approach seeks to 
prioritize efforts in Amran, Al Jawf, Marib, Shabwah, Abyan, Al Dahle’e, Lahj, and 
Aden; all of which are existing or potential safe havens for AQAP.  While this strategy 
astutely identifies and targets the areas where AQAP has a foothold, it has already 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2010/147296.htm (accessed November 2, 2010).  
13 SOCCENT mission outlined in U.S. Agency  for International Development, USAID Yemen:  2010-
2012 Yemen Country Strategy, 12 
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/middle_east/documents/yemen/USAIDYemen2010-2012Strategy.pdf 
(accessed August 22, 2010); the number of counterterrorism advisors referenced from Eric Schmitt and 
Scott Shane, “Aid to Fight Qaeda in Yemen Divides U.S. Officials,” The New York Times (September 15, 
2010). 
14 U.S. Agency for International Development, 2010-2012 Yemen Country Strategy, 2. 
15 Ibid. 
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faltered.  As described within USAID’s strategy document, “resources are insufficient to 
sustain operations in all eight governorates.”16
 The grassroots strategy of USAID has taken a ground-up approach to reforming 
governance in Yemen, but they include the central government of Yemen as an integral 
part to the strategy’s success.  Their efforts at the local level are meant to “raise the 
awareness of the national government to local needs,” with the end-state of making the 
government “more responsive to the people’s needs.”
 This fact highlights the vulnerabilities of 
the weak state strategy where the aims are overly ambitious, and lack the resources of 
major State building efforts such as in Iraq or Afghanistan.   
17
The two pronged strategy toward Yemen focuses on building up the government’s 
security apparatus in the short term, while taking a long term approach towards good 
governance.  The Yemen strategy takes on the same assumptions inherent in the NSS’s 
policy toward weak states.  The broad presumption of the strategy is that the government 
of Yemen shares the same priorities and goals as the United States, thus using its 
increased military capacity to fight AQAP, and becoming more responsive to the 
southern population through better governance.  More importantly, it assumes that state 
building is the key to denying al Qaeda a safe haven in Yemen.  This study asserts that 
the sociopolitical landscape in Yemen as well as the populist strategy of AQAP provides 
evidence to the contrary.   
  This type of strategy is 
obviously long term, in contrast to the fast paced security build up; and its success also 






                                               
16 U.S. Agency for International Development, 2010-2012 Yemen Country Strategy, 2. 
17  U.S. Agency for International Development, 2010-2012 Yemen Country Strategy, 11. 
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COUNCIL:   
“TWO PRONGED  
STRATEGY” TOWARD 
YEMEN 
1.  Strengthen the Government of 
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security and minimize the threat 
from violent extremists within 
its borders. 
 
2. Mitigate Yemen’s economic 
crisis and deficiencies in 
government capacity, provision 
of services, transparency, and 
adherence to the rule of law. 
 
 





1.  Livelihoods in vulnerable 
communities improved:  
Addressing people’s basic 
needs and opportunities at the 
local level by improving their 
access to basic services, by 
expanding economic 
opportunities and by promoting 
political/civic empowerment. 
 
2. Governance capacities to 
mitigate drivers of instability 
improved:  Specifically 
emphasize good governance, 
working at the national, local 
and community levels. 
 
THE POSTURE OF U.S. 
CENTRAL COMMAND  
1.  Help build Yemen’s security, 





D. NEW PROPOSITIONS  
 The propositions presented below are based on the analysis of Yemen’s 
contemporary history, the structure and function of Yemen’s central government, the 
Islamist trends within the population, and the tribal-centric strategy being executed by 
AQAP.  The concluding policy recommendations are based on an analysis of the “two 
pronged” strategy toward Yemen; an analysis which asserts that the aims of the strategy 
are too diffused, and are not realistically tailored for Yemen’s sociopolitical landscape.  
In contrast, the resulting policy recommendations propose a more targeted political 
approach, and a more aggressive counterterrorism effort led by the U.S.   
 Proposition #1:  Building Yemen’s security capacity prior to achieving political 
reform only gives President Saleh the ability to widen the rifts in the South, thus giving 
AQAP the ability to capitalize on their grievance-based approach. While in the long term 
the government of Yemen will need the capacity to secure its borders, strengthening 
President Saleh’s security forces prior to political reform and reconciliation is a 
dangerous proposition.  President Saleh is running an authoritarian government, and if 
given the military means, he will continue to solve his internal problems with force. 
 Proposition #2:  The tribal areas and the population of southern Yemen are the 
center of gravity in the struggle against AQAP.  Therefore, U.S. strategy should focus on 
reconciling the grievances of the southern population through a grassroots approach to 
building capacity, and focusing on tribal support and participation in local government.  
Reconciliation and tribal partnerships in the South are the foundation of good governance 
in Yemen.   
E. STRUCTURING THE ARGUMENT 
The above propositions are illustrated through a sociopolitical analysis of Yemen.  
The analysis addresses the assumptions residing in the U.S. policy toward weak states; 
and the two pronged strategy toward Yemen in particular. The strategy assumes that first, 
the government of Yemen shares the same security concerns as the U.S., and wants to 
cooperate fully in the fight against AQAP; second, that President Saleh values democratic 
governance and is willing to build a more transparent and responsive State; and finally, 
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the strategy assumes that strengthening the State’s capacities is the key to countering 
AQAP.  The following chapters will argue that these assumptions do not accurately 
reflect the sociopolitical conditions within Yemen. 
1. Historical Analysis 
Chapter II will provide an historical background of Yemen which is often 
overlooked, but provides insights into the current political and social structure, as well as 
the origins of the divisions within the country.  The contrasting histories of North and 
South Yemen in particular illuminate the fissures which AQAP is currently exploiting.  
The modern history of Yemen, especially during the mid-20th century, is the formative 
period of the nation; culminating with the unification of North and South Yemen in 1990, 
and the subsequent civil war in 1994.  The history of Yemen reveals the origins of the 
Southern Movement, as well as the importance of the tribal confederations and their link 
with the government.  The formative events in Yemen’s history build the foundation for 
propositions presented above. 
2. Political Analysis 
Chapter III looks at the government institutions and political parties which make 
up Yemen’s pseudo pluralistic system. The chapter demonstrates how President Saleh 
leans towards authoritarianism, purposefully slowing political reform.  After the 1994 
civil war President Saleh isolated and marginalized the southern portion of the country 
and continued the government under a veneer of democracy.    The true government of 
Yemen consists of a vast patronage system run by President Saleh.  The patronage system 
is a true shadow government which gives President Saleh the ability to control events 
throughout a large part of the country through the cooptation of tribal sheiks, and 
opposition leaders.  His efforts at government reform are often shallow and meant to 
solicit foreign aid.  Although the institutions, and in some cases the opposition, 
characteristic of a pluralistic democracy are present, they are often time stymied by the 
patronage system.  As resources are beginning to run out in Yemen, the circle of 
patronage is getting smaller and smaller; in the mean time President Saleh has placed his 
family and members of his tribe in key military and government positions.  The nature of 
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President Saleh’s rule does not lend itself towards transparency and responsiveness; and a 
rapid boost in his security apparatus will only lead to a more authoritarian State. 
3. Socioreligious Analysis 
Chapter IV shifts from a government centric view of Yemen towards its social 
makeup.  The tribally governed areas of both northern and southern Yemen have been 
called “incubators for extremism” by the U.S., yet the religious and social aspects of the 
population indicate otherwise.18
4. Strategic Analysis of AQAP 
 Chapter IV will argue that the tribal populations in 
“ungoverned” areas of Yemen do not provide a breeding ground for extremists, and 
partnerships with tribal communities provides a more powerful tool against AQAP rather 
than building up the State’s security apparatus.  
Chapter V analyzes the background and strategy of AQAP.  The group’s populist 
strategy is a result of al Qaeda’s lessons learned from Iraq, as well as the indigenous 
nature of the AQAP leadership.  The seemingly indiscriminant targeting used by the 
Yemeni counterterrorism forces; and the collateral damage from U.S. missile strikes has 
given AQAP all the fuel they need to win over the population.  Their strategic 
communication, and lack thereof from the U.S., has added to their success.  The analysis 
of AQAP strategy shows that a quick build up of Yemen’s military capacity, prior to 
reforming the government, can have disastrous effects.  Additionally, the study of 
AQAP’s strategy illustrates the importance of placing the southern tribal networks as the 
center of gravity.  The state-centric approach by the U.S. has only further entrenched 





                                               
18 Daniel Benjamin, U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen. 
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5. Policy Recommendations 
Finally, Chapter VI will provide policy recommendations based on the two 
Propositions introduced in this study.  Proposition One asserts that building Yemen’s 
security capacity prior to achieving political reform only gives President Saleh the ability 
to widen the rifts in the South, thus giving AQAP the ability to capitalize on their 
grievance-based approach.  The U.S. should therefore provide Yemen with the ability to 
patrol its coastline and boarders, but not increase its capacity to coerce its population.  
Partnership in counterterrorism should continue, but the U.S. should lead the efforts.  
This includes the addition of counterterrorism operations executed by U.S. Special 
Forces, to selectively target AQAP leadership. Missile attacks from drones and large 
scale offensives by the Yemeni military have only increased AQAP leverage.  This leads 
in to Proposition Two which insists that the tribal areas and the population of southern 
Yemen are the center of gravity in the struggle against AQAP.   The current strategy by 
USAID has essentially acknowledged this fact, but it is woefully under-resourced and 
still assumes cooperation from the central government in helping to build governance in 
the South.  Instead of spreading out resources, the U.S. should focus on a large scale 
campaign to mediate southern grievances; including scheduling talks between tribal 
sheiks, Southern Movement leaders, and the Yemeni government.   
This paper argues that the sociopolitical conditions in Yemen contradict the 
underlying assumptions within the current U.S. strategy, and that a more tailored and 
aggressive approach is necessary to counter AQAP.  The following chapters provide an 
analysis of Yemen’s history, governance, and society; as well as the background and 
strategy of AQAP.  The concluding policy recommendations are based on a more 
accurate assessment of Yemen’s sociopolitical landscape. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
“A page of history is worth a pound of logic” 
                –Oliver Wendell Holmes 
 
The words of Oliver Wendell Holmes could not be more relevant than with the 
U.S. perceptions of Yemen.  Search any of the numerous policy papers, Congressional 
transcripts, or think-tank reports which deal with Yemen and there is scant reference to 
that country’s history prior to the bombing of the USS Cole on October 12, 2000.  
National security policies and strategies which are based on a mere decade of historical 
knowledge are flawed on many levels.  The divisions and grievances which characterize 
the contemporary conflicts of Yemen are born from three formative periods in Yemen’s 
modern history:  first, the imperial rivalries of the 19th century; next, the revolutionary 
turmoil during the 1960s; and finally, the tumultuous unification period during the early 
1990s.  All three of these formative episodes in Yemen’s history have exacerbated the rift 
between the northern and southern populations of the country.  The analysis of Yemen’s 
history points to some key conclusions which should form the core assumptions of U.S. 
strategy toward Yemen: first, Yemen has never been a naturally unified State, therefore 
there is a traditional tendency toward division; second, the Zaydi and tribal 
confederations of the North have always had a dominating influence within government 
and are not inclined to give up control or share power; and finally, the 1990 unification 
and subsequent civil war have magnified the traditional rifts between North and South, 
thus reconciling the grievances from the civil war is a necessity in any government 
reform effort.  While the following analysis of Yemen’s history is not all inclusive, it 
expands on the formative periods in order to identify the key sociopolitical characteristics 
of the country. 
While a state structure did not formally exist in Yemen until 1962, the autonomy 
of the tribal networks, and the central government’s animus towards foreign influence, 
has been an enduring characteristic of Yemeni society.  In addition to the antipathy 
shown towards hegemonic powers such as the Ottoman Empire, the British Empire, 
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, Yemen society itself has long been divided by geographic 
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barriers, and political ideology.19
Three formative periods of Yemeni history are of particular importance.  First, the 
period from 1871 to 1918 holds many milestones which can be viewed as the causal 
factors for the schism between North and South Yemen.  Second, the turbulent period 
between 1962 and 1970; when revolution and civil war fundamentally changed the 
political landscape of the region.  And finally, the period of unification, democracy, and 
civil war from 1990 to 1994 which ushered in an era of militant Islamists and a widening 
rift between the North and South.  These three periods have shaped the current 
sociopolitical conditions in Yemen; they also provide valuable lessons on the tribal-state 
relationship and its impact on events.  As the U.S. strategy toward Yemen holds political 
and social reform as one of its primary tenets, it is important to note the deep-rooted and 
enduring sociopolitical characteristics of the country. 
  Although united politically in 1990, Yemen has never 
been a united society.  Fault lines which are present today where forged over the past 
centuries by Imperial powers, religious leaders, political ideologies, and Islamic 
fundamentalism. 
A. ARABIA FELIX:  A GENERAL HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The strategic importance of Yemen was well known prior to the three formative 
periods mentioned above.  Yemen was not only an ancient crossroads for trade, but it was 
also a producer of desired commodities. Additionally, the climate between the mountains 
and the Red Sea on the Western coast of modern day Yemen produced a fertile 
environment for crops and livestock to flourish.20 “The fabled home of the Queen of 
Sheba and the Maji, famed for its frankincense and later its coffee, this zone was known 
to the Romans and later to European cartographers as Arabia Felix.”21
Despite the well traveled trade route and profitable coffee production, European 
empires remained content on the shores of the Mediterranean; the Ottomans being the 
  
                                               
19 Sarah Phillips, Yemen’s Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective:  Patronage and Pluralized 
Authoritarianism (New York, NY:  Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 41. 
20 Sheila Carapico, “Arabia Incognita:  An Invitation to Arabian Peninsula Studies,” in Counter-
Narratives:  History, Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, eds. Madawi Al-
Rasheed and Rovert Vitalis (Gorndonsville, VA:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 25. 
21 Ibid. 
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exception to this rule.  The Ottoman Empire expanded its influence over Yemen in the 
mid 16th century.  But less than a century later they decided to leave southern Arabia in 
order to focus on their European borders.  The Ottomans were never able to subjugate the 
Zaydi tribes in the northern highlands of Yemen, and they eventually determined that the 
price of continual tribal conflict was too high.22
B. IMPERIAL INFLUENCE IN YEMEN FROM 1871–1918   
  Without external pressures the Zaydi 
Imamate was able to expand its influence from the northern highlands in to the southern 
and eastern lowlands of Yemen.  However, the arrival of the British Empire in 1839 
began a new age of Imperial competition, and proved to be a barrier to Zaydi expansion. 
What could be described as a lesser version of “The Great Game” being played 
out in Afghanistan, the imperial competition between the Ottoman and British Empires in 
southern Arabia was no less formative to the region.23  While the British arrival in Aden 
in 1839 may have slowed the aspirations of the Zaydi imamate in the North, the 
subsequent construction of the Suez Canal in 1869 quickly and fundamentally changed 
the political dynamics within Yemen.  The independence of the Imamate in the highlands 
came to an end in 1871 as the Ottomans returned to govern northern Yemen in an effort 
to counter British influence in Aden. 24  In a response to the Ottoman incursion into 
northern Yemen, the British expanded their control of southern Yemen territory by 
“bringing the hinterlands into a treaty of protection,” thus forming a buffer against 
Ottoman and Zaydi expansion.25
                                               
22 Victoria Clark, Yemen:  Dancing on the Heads of Snakes, 15. 
 The modern era of Ottoman control only lasted until 
1918, but it left behind a framework for modernization, and also shaped the policies of 
the British in southern Yemen, who would ultimately stay in control until 1967.  The 
North-South border delineated by a Turk-Anglo agreement would be the enduring legacy 
23 The Great Game refers to the Imperial competition between the British and Russian Empires in 
Afghanistan during the late 19th century.  In that case European drawn borders such as the Durand line 
separating Pakistan and Afghanistan are still having an effect on contemporary event. 
24 Victoria Clark, Yemen:  Dancing on the Heads of Snakes (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 
2010), 37. 
25 John M. Willis, “Leaving Only Question-marks:  Geographies of Rule in Modern Yemen,” in 
Counter-Narratives:  History, Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, eds. 
Madawi Al-Rasheed and Rovert Vitalis (Gorndonsville, VA:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 123. 
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of the imperial rivalry, and it would go on to shape both physical and political divisions 
for decades to come. In addition to their dealings with the British, the Ottomans’ 
interaction with the Zaydi imamate during the period between 1871 and 1918 provides 
valuable insight into current sociopolitical conditions in northern Yemen. 
The Ottomans’ second attempt at controlling the highlands of Yemen was marked 
by social and political improvements, but was ultimately marred by failure due to the 
strong partnership fostered between the Imamate and the northern tribes.  The intent of 
Constantinople was to bring Yemen into the Ottoman fold; much like its provinces in the 
Levant.  But early reform efforts for the “backward” tribal society in northern Yemen 
focused on pacification of the cycle of revolts led by the Hamid al-Dins Imamate.26 After 
an especially violent revolt led by Imam Yayha in 1904, the Ottomans put together a 
Commission to find ways to reform Yemen with methods other than military 
suppression.27
The Memduh Commission of 1904 was a review of failed policies in Yemen, and 
it recommended solutions to effectively govern the region.
 Certain aspects of the Ottoman plan are strikingly similar to the current 
U.S. strategy toward Yemen.   
28  The report focused on 
solutions other than force in order to win over the population from the rebels; and 
recognized poverty and a stagnant economy as focus areas.29  For the Ottoman’s there 
was a deliberate emphasis on state-building including education reform, infrastructure 
and governance.  The Imamate’s use of Shari’a law was replaced by the Ottoman system 
of justice; a robust educational system was implemented; and provincial governments 
were set up to decentralize control.30
                                               
26 Jon Mandaville, “Memduh Pasha and Aziz Bey:  Ottoman Experience in Yemen,” in Contemporary 
Yemen: Politics and Historical Background, ed. B.R. Pridham (New York, NY:  St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 
21. 
 Many of the reforms were never implemented 
however due to the divisive influence of Imam Yahya.  In 1908 the Imam signed a treaty 
with the Ottoman governor which reinstated Shari’a as the basis for the legal system in 
27 Ibid.  
28 The Memduh Commission has strikingly similar findings as contemporary U.S. commissions on the 
same subject. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 26. 
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areas under Imamate control.  Additionally, in 1911, after another revolt led by Yahya, 
the Ottoman’s officially recognized the Imam’s control over the northern highlands; all 
but granting the Zaydi Imamate independence.31
In contrast to the Ottoman policies in Yemen, the aim of the British was to control 
the port of Aden, not to bring the entire region under the control of the Crown.  But due 
to the Ottoman influence in the North, the British assumed an indirect form of control 
over the Yemeni population on the periphery of Aden.  The addition of the West and East 
Aden Protectorates to the British sphere of influence was supposed to protect the port of 
Aden from Ottoman and Imamate intrusion; but the undoing of British control would 
ultimately come from the restive tribal regions of these peripheral territories.   
 Official independence came in 1918, as 
the Ottoman Empire collapsed after its defeat in WWI.  Once free from imperial 
restraints the imam then turned his attention south, to the British controlled protectorates. 
From the late 19th century until the middle of the twentieth century, the British 
used the tribal areas surrounding Aden as a defensive buffer against foreign influence.  
Agreements made by the British and Ottoman Empires in 1905, and later in 1914 set 
geographical boundaries between North and South Yemen; but just as important, the 
agreements recognized specific tribes as under the protection of the British, thus creating 
a sociopolitical division between the two Yemens.32  The so-called “nine tribes” 
associated with the border area included the ‘Abdali, ‘Aqrabi, ‘Alawi, Amiri, ‘Awlaqi, 
Fadli, Hawshabi, Subayhi, and the Yafi’i’ tribes.33
                                               
31 John M. Willis,“Leaving Only Question-marks,” 128-129. 
 In addition to these tribes, which 
would come to make up the Western Aden Protectorate (WAP), areas east including the 
culturally significant Hadramawt province would make up the Eastern Aden Protectorate 
 
 
32 Ibid. 124.  The Joint Anglo-Turkish Boundary Commission of 1902-1905 officially delineated the 
North-South boundary between the Aden Protectorates and Yemen.  The “Violet Line” line which extends 
at a 45 degree angle to the Northeast of the Protectorates was agreed upon in 1914.  John T. Ducker and 
others, Without Glory in Arabia:  The British Retreat from Aden (London:  I.B. Tauris, 2006), 12. 
33 While appearing to be an irrelevant list of long defunct tribal names, a few of these tribes have 
appeared in recent headlines as being associated with the resurgence of al Qaeda, including the Awlaqi and 
Fadhli tribes.  List of nine tribes given in R.J. Gavin, Aden Under British Rule, 1839-1967 (London:  C. 
Hurst & Company, 1975), 127. 
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(EAP).  Together these two protectorates would form the defensive hinterland which was 
meant to buffer the port of Aden from the Ottomans, and more importantly, from the 
Imamate.  
Although the British had agreements with the Ottomans which demarcated 
geographical boundaries, Imam Yahya unabashedly pushed his temporal and physical 
rule southwards.   The Imam intentionally stirred up tribal discontent in the border region, 
and in 1915 even going as far as capturing Lahaj, a small town on the Northern doorstep 
of Aden.34  It was not until 1934 that the then independent Imamate signed an agreement 
with the British Empire officially recognizing the North-South boundary.35  The Ottoman 
presence in northern Yemen in the late 19th century, followed by the Imamates continual 
claims to Aden in the early 20th century, gave the British all the motivation they needed 
to use the tribal areas surrounding Aden as a defensive buffer.  Yet as they developed 
their colony in Aden, the surrounding protectorates where left in a state of legal limbo:  a 
staggering total of ninety treaties defined the complex relationship between the British 
and the tribal areas, which consisted of less than one million inhabitants.36
C. CEMENTING THE DIVISIONS:  POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
REVOLUTION, 1962–1970  
 The resulting 
social divide between the hinterlands and the Crown Colony would ultimately cause an 
irreconcilable rift and set North and South Yemen down very different political paths. 
The unique fates awaiting North and South Yemen during the 20th century were 
to solidify the divisions formed during the imperial era.  The independent path of 
northern Yemen after WWI was in stark contrast to the imperialist fate which fell upon 
the rest of the Middle East.  The Imamate was declared independent in 1918, and for the 
next thirty years until Imam Ahmed took over for his father Yahya, the Mutawakkil 
Kingdom remained a clannishly isolated society.  In contrast, the South remained under 
the influence of the British Empire, but after WWII as the Eastern holdings of the Empire 
began to break free, Aden’s value to the British was in question.  However, as the rest of 
                                               
34 Joseph Kostiner, The Struggle for South Yemen (New York, NY:  St. Martin’s, 1984), 4. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Victoria Clark, Yemen:  Dancing on the Heads of Snakes, 37. 
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the Arab world began to gain their independence, the British doggedly held on to their 
territory in and around Aden.  Events of the 1960s would prove to be revolutionary for 
both North and South Yemen; and as the dust settled, two vastly different nations 
emerged. In the end, the northern Zaydi elites and tribal sheiks climbed to prominence 
and they “remain dominant in the country today.”37
1. The North 
  
North Yemen has remained a unique state in the Middle East beginning with its 
incarnation as the Mutawakkil Kingdom in the post Ottoman era. Independence from 
European imperialism during that period was the exception rather than the rule in the 
Middle East.  Except for Turkey, the rest of the former Ottoman Empire had been carved 
up and divided among the victorious European powers. Northern Yemen had remained an 
independent Imamate; and a xenophobic one at that.  Imam Yahya not only limited 
foreign exposure inside of Yemen, but he also forbade travel outside of the country until 
1947.38  Both Imam Yahya and his son Ahmed were able to consolidate their power and 
secure their border areas during this time by subjugating the smaller tribes and forming 
alliances with the two main tribal confederations; the Hashid and Bakil.39
 The revolution which ejected the Imamate from power in North Yemen was the 
result of a perfect storm of sociopolitical events.   First, after the death of Imam Yahya, 
his son Ahmed began to break from the isolationist tradition of his father.  This new 
‘openness’ along with the rise of the pan-Arab movement led by Egyptian President 
Gamal Nasser, had thrust Yemen into a new era of modernity.  Ahmed had unknowingly 
placed Yemen’s fate into the hands of a foreign government by signing on as a member 
  These strong 
tribal relationships would endure throughout the revolution and civil war of the 1960s, 
and make it possible for the tribes to embed themselves into the contemporary governing 
system of Yemen.   
                                               
37 Stephen Day, The Political Challenge of Yemen’s Southern Movement (Washington, D.C.:  
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 3. 
38 Sarah Phillips, Yemen’s Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective, 43. 
39 Robert D. Burrowes, “Prelude to Unification:  The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962–1990,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 23 (1991): 483–506. 
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of the United Arab States, a new Arab confederation headed by the United Arab Republic 
(Egypt and Syria).40
The September revolt, and the subsequent civil war, changed a long standing 
paradigm in North Yemen.   After centuries of rule by the Zaydi Imamate, the newly 
declared Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) came under military rule.  And for the first time 
in modern history, the loyalties of the major tribal confederations were split.
  The most significant part of this new partnership was the 
renaissance of sociopolitical ideas taught to Yemeni military officers who were being 
trained and educated in Egypt.  The death of Imam Ahmed in September 1962 opened the 
flood gates of change into North Yemen.  With a frenzied nationalist fervor, the Yemeni 
military saw their chance to ride the Nasserist wave into power.   
41 This did 
not mean that the tribal loyalties were steadfast; on the contrary, they often shifted their 
loyalties based on who offered the best financing.42
The North Yemen Civil War is often overlooked by Middle Eastern historians, 
but its significance to the region, and Yemen in particular, cannot be underestimated.  A 
full survey of the war is not necessary in this study, merely a review of its significant 
sociopolitical aftereffects.  However, a brief review is necessary to provide historical 
context to current issues, and to highlight the pitfalls of using large conventional armies 
to suppress tribally entrenched insurgencies.  As discussed in Chapter five, President 
Saleh’s use of the military to suppress tribally entrenched cells of AQAP has produced 
similar results. 
But in the end the tribes became the 
backbone to the so called “Royalist” camp, and they were responsible for bogging down 
the Egyptian forces sent by Nasser to defend the new Arab Republic.  In an extremely 
destructive civil war, the tribal confederations managed to come out on top. 
The Egyptian intervention in Yemen began in October 1962, shortly after the 
September revolt.  Nasser described the resulting quagmire as his “Vietnam,” and 
rightfully so.  At its peak involvement in 1965, Egypt had deployed 70,000 troops to 
                                               
40 Mohammed A. Zabarah, “The Yemeni Revolution of 1962 seen as a Social Revolution,” in 
Contemporary Yemen:  Politics and Historical Background, ed. P.R. Prinham (New York, NY:  St. 
Martin’s Press, 1984), 78. 
41 Ibid., 80. 
42 Victoria Clark, Yemen:  Dancing on the Heads of Snakes, 99. 
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Yemen; approximately one third of the entire Egyptian Army.43 The army was ill 
prepared to fight in Yemen, even lacking basic maps of the country; they were even 
surprised to find themselves in mountainous terrain rather than the expected desert 
conditions they had planned on.44
The regular Egyptian Army was trained to fight a conventional war on the deserts 
of the Sinai Peninsula, but they found themselves trapped in the cat and mouse game of 
counterinsurgency in the rugged terrain of North Yemen.  The Egyptian response to tribal 
warfare was a scorched earth policy, including the use of chemical weapons on civilian 
populations in the northern highlands.
  
45  Yet these types of tactics only entrenched the 
tribal forces.  In the end, the Egyptians were never able to subdue the tribes, or the Saudi 
backed “Royalist” forces.  Many high ranking Egyptian officers blame the quagmire in 
Yemen for their devastating defeat in the 1967 Six Day War: a defeat which Nasser never 
recovered from.46  In a lucid reflection of the intervention, Egyptian Field Marshal al-
Amer stated:  “After years of experience we realized that it was a war between tribes and 
that we entered it without knowing the nature of their land, their traditions and their 
ideas.”47
Although Egypt withdrew from Yemen in 1967, the civil war between the 
military led Republic, and the tribally backed Royalists lasted for another three years; 
ending with a significant reconciliation.  In 1969 “a group of what the historian Fred 
Halliday calls “tribalist republicans”—General al-Amri, President Abdul Rahman al-
Iryani and Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar were in a strong enough position to extend a 
conciliatory hand to the Royalists.”
 
48
                                               
43 David M. Witty, “A Regular Army in Counterinsurgency Operations:  Egypt in North Yemen, 
1962-1967,” The Journal of Military History 65, no. 2 (April, 2001): 401-439. 
  The conciliatory government of the YAR was 
vastly different than the Imamate which was in power in 1962; and it was a departure 
44 Ibid. 
45 Victoria Clark, Yemen:  Dancing on the Heads of Snakes, 97. 
46 David M. Witty, “A Regular Army in Counterinsurgency Operations,” 401-439. 
47 Victoria Clark, Yemen:  Dancing on the Heads of Snakes, 100. 
48 Ibid., 101.  The rise of Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar is of great significance due to his leadership of 
the Hashid tribal confederation.  He would entrench the northern tribes in Yemen’s government until his 
death in 2007. 
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from the Nasserist style government which had taken control after the coup.  The new 
tribally anchored government mixed modernity with tribal hierarchies and societal norms, 
and it was in a position to counter the new Marxist state of South Yemen which had 
finally gained its independence from the British in 1967.  The divisions between the 
North and South were solidified with ideological differences which are still in place 
today. 
2. The South 
The road to independence for the South led them in a vastly different direction 
than the North.  The rise of a socialist society, and a Marxist government resulted in the 
marginalization of tribalism.  The shift in societal norms produced the fractionalized 
population which resides in the area today.  But prior to their Marxist slant, the southern 
revolutionaries were allied with the Nasserists in the North.  Early resistance to British 
control was backed by Nasser in an effort to provide a “southern flank” to his war in 
North Yemen.  Initially both the YAR and opposition groups in the South had joined 
forces in the name of pan-Arabism and a united Yemen.  But as Nasser’s influence began 
to wane, southern political groups began to lean more to the left and adopt Marxist and 
Maoist worldviews.  For their part, the British had been powerless to stop a revolt which 
would ultimately push them out of Aden and usher in a Marxist regime in South Yemen.   
British efforts to form the independent and Anglo-friendly nation of South Arabia 
ended in disaster, leading to their withdrawal in 1967.  After WWII the British 
maintained their colony in Aden despite the receding nature of European imperialism.  In 
particular, British holdings “east of Suez” were gaining independence, including India in 
1947.  Instead of giving up its strategically located port, the British decided to develop 
Aden as the Middle East Headquarters for its military.  In lieu of keeping Aden as a 
permanent colony, they devised a plan to build a nation from the East and West 
Protectorates; with the ultimate goal of adding South Arabia as a Commonwealth nation.   
Yet attempts to create an independent nation on their own terms had failed.  The 
initial steps at building the South Arabian nation started with the formation of a 
Federation of states in 1959.  The Federation of South Arabia was an attempt at giving 
the protectorates political autonomy with the aim of uniting them with Aden.  Ironically 
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their earlier strategy of isolating Aden from the tribally controlled protectorates came 
back to haunt them.  Within the socially divided groups residing in the urban areas of 
Aden, as well as in the hinterland; Arab nationalism had led both groups to resist further 
British control.  A revolt in the Fahlan region north of Aden in 1963 was the beginning of 
the end for British control of its colony.  Out of the revolt came the main opposition 
group, the National Liberation Front (NLF), which aligned itself with pan-Arab goals and 
gained support from Nasser.   
In a maneuver being replicated by AQAP, the NLF sought to take advantage of 
the rift between tribes and the ruling sultans of the protectorate.   The British had been 
coopting the sultans, emirs and sheiks of the tribal regions for decades and intentionally 
withholding any developmental aid to the hinterlands.49
A defense “white paper” released by the British in 1966 signaled the end of their 
presence in Yemen, and led to a scramble for power within South Yemen.  The white 
paper announced the end of all agreements between the Federation of South Arabia by 
1968, thus leaving the coopted leaders of the protectorates high and dry.  With British 
power in South Yemen marginalized, the opposition groups began to vie for influence 
through the use of violence.  The NLF was not the only group vying for power however; 
their main competitor was the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY).  Egypt 
had made attempts to nudge the two groups together, but their attempts at merger had 
revealed a rift in the leadership of the NLF.  A “secondary leadership” emerged which 
espoused a Marxist view, and a claim as the true leaders of the movement.
  The narrative of the NLF fit 
perfectly with that of the pan-Arab movement, and it provided plenty of incentive for the 
disenfranchised population of the protectorates.  Initially, both the Egyptians and the NLF 
had their sights set on unifying the two Yemens; but as Nasser began to lose influence, 
and the British signaled their plans to depart Yemen, the NLF began to radicalize their 
political ideologies.   
50
                                               
49 Mohammed A. Zabarah, “The Yemeni Revolution of 1962 Seen as a Social Revolution,” 89. 
  While 
 
 
50 Josheph Kostiner, The Struggle for South Yemen, 120. 
 26 
Nasser attempted to unify FLOSY and the NLF in order to strengthen his hand in North 
Yemen, the two groups instead went to war with each other in 1966, and pointed South 




Figure 2.   North and South Yemen 
3. Two Yemeni Nations 
The decline of Nasserism after Egypt’s defeat in the Six Day War, in addition to 
the departure of the British from Aden in 1967, left South Yemen in the hands of the 
Marxist leaning NLF, thus placing the two Yemens on opposite sides of an ideological 
spectrum.  From 1967 through the early 1970s, the newly independent States settled into 
their own unique forms of government.  In the North the Imamate had been transformed 
into a Republic which not only had the support of the Hashid and Bakil tribal 
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confederations, but included them in their leadership.  Instead of being marginalized as 
they had been during the Ottoman era, the tribes were now an integral part of the 
government of the new Republic.   
In the South the transition from a British imperialism to statehood went much 
different than either Great Britain or the Nasser had envisioned.  Instead of becoming a 
southern version of the YAR, South Yemen was quickly transformed into a Marxist 
society.  The NLF which had sought to “eliminate ‘the tribal spirit’”52 in the South, had 
created a socialist state which was ideologically opposed to the tribalism; a societal norm 
still revered in the North.  Interestingly enough, the YAR and the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (PDRY) continued to seek unification throughout the next twenty 
years.  But as the new states settled on their respective forms of government, divisions 
between the anti-tribal socialists of the South, and the tribally infused government of the 
North began to solidify.  The practicality of unification did not show itself until the 
discovery of oil reserves on the border between the two states during the 1980s.53
By the time unification became a political reality in 1990 the North had the upper 
hand.  Its government had been relatively stable since 1978, the year President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh began his tenure.  The YAR’s economy was mostly fed by billions of 
dollars of remittances from citizens who had been working abroad; most in the oil fields 
of Saudi Arabia.  Their government included multiple political groupings, the most 
significant being the General People’s Congress, which is still the ruling party of Yemen 
today.  
   
The South in contrast, was suffering through violent political turmoil.  The year 
1986 was an especially bloody year for the government and the people of the PDRY.  A 
political purge in the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), in early 1986 had taken the lives of 
over 4,000 South Yemeni leaders and citizens.   This civil war not only signaled the near 
death of the Marxist ideology in South Yemen, but it also revealed that tribalism was still 
alive and well despite twenty years of communist rule.  The political disputes between 
President Ali Nasir and his Soviet backed rival Abd al-Fattah turned into a tribal war 
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between Nasir’s Dathina tribe in Abyan, and the Radfani tribe in Lahej.54
A window of opportunity opened up for the two Yemens at the end of the decade.  
The end of the Cold War and continued cooperation in oil extraction on the border 
provinces of Marib and Shabwa provided the foundation for unification.  The sudden 
decision to unify in 1990 took the world by surprise. Suddenly, the two states which had 
traveled down separate paths since 1962 found themselves in an awkward marriage.  The 
sociopolitical divisions cemented by nearly thirty years of separation could not be 
overlooked for long.  The dominant and aggressive northern government took charge in 
the new Republic of Yemen, and although incorporated into a new pluralistic democracy, 
the YSP and the tribes of the South found themselves to be a marginalized and exploited 
population. 
 In the end, a 
hard-line leader seized power of the southern government and unification seemed to take 
a back seat to political ideology once more.   
D. DEMOCRACY IN YEMEN 
The unification of Yemen and the subsequent sociopolitical events which 
unfolded are pivotal toward understanding the pitfalls of the current U.S. strategy.  The 
political grievances of the southern population reside in the flawed unification process 
and the resulting civil war.55
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 Efforts to reform Yemen’s government should start from the 
conditions of 1990; and the Saleh regime’s trend of using force to solve political disputes 
should raise a warning flag as the U.S. attempts to boost Yemen’s security sector prior to 
political reform.  This period also demonstrates the government of Yemen’s concerted 
efforts to marginalize the South, thus disputing the assumption in U.S. policy that the 
Saleh regime is willing to proceed with a transparent and responsive government.  The 
unification and civil war period underscores the divisions which need to be reconciled 
before the northern-centric security arm of President Saleh is built up via U.S. assistance.   
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There have not been many instances in history where the unification of a nation 
has caused more division than goodwill; but this describes the 1990 union between the 
YAR and PDRY.  The period from 1990–1994 can be directly correlated to the current 
turmoil in Yemen.  Even though the new Republic of Yemen emerged as the first 
Democracy on the Arabian Peninsula, leading the New York Times to proclaim after the 
1993 parliamentary elections, “Something wonderful has happened in Yemen;” yet there 
was something rotten in Sana’a.56
The reasons behind the rushed unification of Yemen are still under debate.  While 
some believe that President Saleh and General Secretary Ali Salem al-Bidh were both 
guilty of using the unification for their own short term political leverage;
  Although the announced democratization brought 
praise and financial aid from the international community, the new Republic of Yemen 
was cut down in its youth after voting against the U.S. led military efforts to oust Saddam 
Hussein from Kuwait.  The resulting economic catastrophe mortally wounded Yemen, 
and it still haunts the country to this day. The inevitable civil war which ensued during 
the spring of 1994 forcefully stopped the secession of the South, but the postwar ‘union’ 
left southern Yemen in a weak and dangerous position, widening rifts between the tribal 
networks and the Saleh regime in the North.  The wounds of unification and civil war left 
the door open for militant Islamist influence, separatist movements and insurrection; 
characteristics which define the sociopolitical landscape of Yemen today. 
57 others 
contend that after a successful decade of growth in the North, President Saleh was able to 
finally operate from a position of strength against the PDRY which had been 
economically and politically weakened after the withdraw of Soviet support.58
The YAR and the PDRY had been operating under an ethos of cooperation; 
initiating efforts toward political coordination and integration years before the 1990 
There is 
truth to both of these explanations, but they are not the only reasons for Yemen’s 
‘shotgun wedding.’ 
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unification.59After oil was discovered on the border region in 1984, both nations had 
cooperated to develop and extract the oil, but underlying tensions continued to erupt into 
a border war.  In order to avoid conflict, a “neutral zone” was set up on the border region 
in 1988.  Additionally, citizens of both countries could freely pass across the border.  
There was also integration of power grids between the North and South, and talk of 
setting up cooperative use of the oil refinery in Aden.60
At the end of the 1980s, President Saleh was in a position to expand his power 
into South Yemen.  Robert Burrowes asserts that several socioeconomic variables helped 
place Yemen in a position of power over the PDRY.  First, workers’ remittances 
produced “widespread consumption and prosperity” among the general population in the 
YAR. Instead of money being distributed to the elite few within society, remittances were 
placed in the hands of the citizens and spread evenly across the country.  Second, the 
newly formed Central Bank and the restructuring of the Yemen Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, gave the government two institutions which were able to successfully 
handle foreign aid.  And finally, the responsible handling of the new oil income helped 
strengthen the nation’s economy:  oil revenue went towards investment within Yemen, 
rather than straight to the political elite. 
 The cooperation between the two 
Yemens reached its peak by the time unification talks commenced in earnest.  But the 
cooperation was not occurring merely out of good will.  Both nations had something to 
gain by unification; unfortunately, the South had much to lose. 
61
In contrast to the YAR, the PDRY was suffering economically due to political 
change.  As the Soviet Union began to decline, the PDRY was one of the many client 
states which lost financial and political support.  The worldwide decline of communism 
came only a few years after the ‘January events of 1986,’ which weakened the leadership 
 
 
  Riding the economic success, Saleh had the 
momentum he needed to push for a quick union with a weakened South. 
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base of the country.  The economic turmoil resulting from these events gave Ali Salem 
al-Bidh and the PDRY all the motivation they needed to unify with the relatively 
prosperous north.62
Beyond the power politics and the economics, both Yemens pursued a quick 
union in order to avoid conflict.  Both Saleh and al-Bidh believed that the only way to 
avoid another border war, especially over the new oil fields, was unification.
 
63
In a rushed process from November 1989 to May 1990, the long sought 
unification of Yemen was made official on 22 May 1990.  Although the process of 
unification had been going off and on since 1972, including a draft constitution which 
was created in 1981, it took only six months to finalize the union.  Against the better 
judgment of the PDRY, which had preferred a long transition period, President Saleh 
“rushed and bullied” al-Bidh into the shortened timeline.
  Whether 
the unification helped avoid a war, or just delay it, is up for debate.  For the short term, 
conflict was avoided and unification seemed to be advantageous for both nations.  
Regardless of the reasons for unification, the flawed nature of the process continues to 
affect the Republic of Yemen. 
64
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 Despite providing a 
democratic framework for government, the unification agreement put off several key 
processes which would prove fatal.  First and foremost, the militaries of each independent 
Yemen had not been unified into one force.  Instead they remained under the command of 
their respective authorities, and rather than integrate forces, select units from each 
military would switch positions across the border.  In addition to the military segregation, 
governmental segregation occurred as well.  The power-sharing agreement favored the 
more populous north; and with parliamentary elections set for only two years after 
unification, the Yemen Socialist Party representing the south was at a distinct 
disadvantage.  The political and military segregations were only amplified by world 
events which put Yemen in the hot seat. 
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The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990 was not only devastating to the 
combatants; an equally destructive fate befell Yemen.  The new Republic of Yemen was 
at the wrong place at the wrong time when it comes to international politics.  A longtime 
partner with Iraq and Saddam Hussein, President Saleh found himself in an 
uncomfortable position.  Yemen found itself on the Security Council at the time of the 
UN resolutions which authorized force against Iraq, and instead of falling in line with the 
U.S. and other Arab nations such as Egypt, Saleh decided to stand his ground and push 
for a peaceful “Arab solution” to the crisis.  Yemen’s ‘no’ vote on UN Resolution 687 led 
to economic ruin for the new Republic.65
The financial cost of Yemen’s first foray into international politics was the loss of 
$70 million of annual aid from the U.S.; but even worse, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait sent 
home the millions of Yemeni oil workers whose remittance money was so vital to the 
Yemeni economy.  While the U.S. has a short memory with such matters, the Saudis and 
Kuwaitis do not.  As will be covered in a later chapter, the U.S. has recommenced aid to 
Yemen, but the rest of the Arabian Peninsula is not as forthcoming.  The economic hole 
grew even deeper after the war as oil prices dropped, devaluing what little oil production 
Yemen was able to squeeze out.  As the economic picture dimmed, so too did the chances 
for a vibrant democracy. 
 
The unification process continued despite the economic bad luck, but the flaws of 
the process reared their ugly head.  In the run-up to parliamentary elections in 1993, 
political violence in Sana’a led the leaders of the YSP, including Vice President al-Bihd, 
to evacuate the capital and re-form in Aden.  The political process continued and the vote 
went as scheduled in April 1993.  The election was deemed free and fare by the multitude 
of observers, but the results were predictable.  The president’s GPC received 40% of the 
seats, while the YSP received only 20%.66
By August 1993 another political crisis erupted as al-Bidh suddenly left for Aden 
once again, this time leaving behind a list of 18 grievances he wanted addressed before he 
 Even though the YSP respected the results and 
seated their members, the two sides were sliding towards confrontation. 
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would come back.67
E. CIVIL WAR 
 Despite the mediation efforts of Egypt, Oman, and the UAE, the 
crisis dragged on for a year without reconciliation.  On the first anniversary of the 1993 
vote, a battle erupted between the still segregated militaries.  Events slid out of control 
and the crisis slipped into a civil war. 
The 1994 Civil War was the culmination of the flawed unification process, and its 
outcome only deepened the rift between North and South.  Al-Bidh formally announced 
the South’s secession, and the formation of the Democratic Republic of Yemen on May 
21, 1994.  In late July, the South fell to President Saleh’s forces and the Republic of 
Yemen was forcefully unified.  The military details of the war are not as important as the 
political consequences.  President Saleh and the central government of Yemen proceeded 
to amend the constitution to marginalize the YSP and consolidate power in the 
North.68
Ironically, an unlikely ally of Saleh during the civil war is now entrenching itself 
in the south, taking advantage of the grievances caused by the flawed unification and the 
civil war.  The Afghan Arabs, fresh from their success in the Soviet-Afghan War were 
more than willing to team with Saleh to defeat the “Marxist” YSP during the civil war.  
But as the rifts between the north and south continue to grow those same militants have 
turned their attention to Saleh, the Yemeni government, and beyond.
Since the end of the 1994, southern Yemen seems to be paying dearly for its 
secession:  Oil revenue from southern oil fields is being redistributed to the northern 
patronage system and the YSP has remained a beaten political force.  Despite the oil 
revenue from the South, the economic condition of Yemen as a whole has declined.  The 
revenue and the institutions to handle the revenue are deteriorating rapidly.   
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 An analysis of Yemen’s history provides three key points which should form the 
core assumptions of U.S. policy.  First, Yemen has never been a naturally unified State; 
the divisions between northern and southern societies are not a recent manifestation.  The 
divisions have certainly been solidified through imperial competition as well as 
contrasting political ideologies, but the people of Yemen have only recently been thrown 
together into one nation.  Second, the Zaydi and tribal confederations of the North have 
always had a dominating influence in government.  The traditional Hashid and Bakil 
tribal confederations have held great sway throughout Yemen’s contemporary history.  
This is no different today as President Saleh, the ruling party, the military elite, and even 
the leadership of the ‘opposition’ are all connected to these dominating tribal hierarchies.  
Third, the 1990 unification and subsequent civil war have magnified the traditional rifts 
between North and South; thus President Saleh will not likely provide the same 
responsiveness to the southern population as he does with the North.   
 The three formative periods of Yemen’s history have shaped the sociopolitical 
characteristics of the country today.  Since the end of the civil war Yemen has settled into 
a status quo of a transitional democratic State; but as the next chapter will illustrate, 
democracy has become a façade for President Saleh’s authoritarian control.  U.S. policy 
makers have not necessarily been fooled by the veneer, but the strategy toward Yemen 
has presumed that the ruling party is marching towards a more open polity.  As history 
has shown, the grip of northern rule may be difficult to break. 
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III. THE OBSTACLES TO REFORM:  DEMOCRACY, 
PLURALISM, AND THE PATRONAGE SYSTEM IN YEMEN 
“Ruling Yemen is like Dancing on the heads of snakes.” 
      -President Ali Abdullah Saleh70
 
 
There are two contrasting sides to the government of Yemen:  The first is the 
image of a promising pluralistic democracy representative of the people; and the second 
is the authoritarian rule of President Saleh and the northern elite.  Unfortunately the 
former has become a façade for the latter, and although the U.S. may acknowledge this, 
the strategy initiated by the NSC has assumed that President Saleh prefers democracy 
over authoritarianism.  This assumption would have to be true in order to achieve what 
the U.S. considers to be the overarching goal of development and security assistance in 
Yemen; “to improve stability and security by improving governance and helping to meet 
pressing socio-economic challenges.”71
There have been efforts to forge honesty and openness in Yemen’s government:  
The U.S. has stated that their solution to reducing the corruption within the Yemeni 
government is to work with ‘relevant’ institutions such as the National Audit Board and 
the Supreme National Anti Corruption Commission.
 The improvement in governance, as mentioned 
previously, is to increase the transparency and responsiveness of the government. Yet, 
without a willing and honest partner in Yemen’s government, these objectives cannot be 
achieved.   
72
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toward Yemen, the utilization of security assistance is outpacing the developmental 
funding.  This has served to strengthen President Saleh’s authoritarian rule. 
This chapter will show that President Saleh and his ruling party have used the 
democratic foundations of Yemen’s government as a veneer for their patronage-based 
system of authoritarian rule.  Consequently, they are more than willing to accept security 
assistance and foreign aid, while only half heartedly pushing for viable reform.  Most 
importantly, the quick buildup of the security apparatus prior to achieving tangible 
political reform has provided the Saleh regime with the means to suppress political 
opposition in the South.   
The discussion will begin with a look at the foundations of democracy in Yemen, 
including the governmental structure as envisioned by the constitution.  Then, there will 
be a review of the political parties within the government, including the evolution and 
viability of opposition groups.  After reviewing the democratic structure, the analysis of 
government will uncover the importance of the patronage system under President Saleh; 
including the cooptation of security, the divisive nature of patronage in the South, and 
finally the effects of shrinking revenue on the system.  Ultimately the analysis shows that 
the assumptions inherent within the U.S. strategy toward Yemen are not in line with the 
true characteristics of Yemen’s system of governance; and more importantly, that the 
flow of security assistance has outpaced government reform, therefore bolstering the 
authoritarian regime at the expense of good governance. 
A. THE FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY 
One of the tenets of U.S. strategy toward Yemen is to help build a more 
responsive, decentralized democracy:  If this is the case, all they have to do is dust off the 
Republic’s original 1990 constitution, where all the tools are in place to achieve this 
goal.73
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  But the pluralized democracy which was formed in Yemen in 1990 has been 
shelved in favor of a more authoritarian rule by President Saleh and the GPC party.  The 
authoritarian rule has tended to isolate the southern political movements and consolidate 
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power in the North.  A comparison of the pre-war constitution and the 1994 amended 
version shows the deliberate move towards a more centralized government.  These 
amendments not only shifted power towards the executive branch, but they paved the 
way to marginalizing the South politically and socially.   
 The ratification of the Republic’s first constitution in 1991 was a promising start 
to the only democracy on the Arabian Peninsula; but as regional rivalries dirtied the first 
elections in 1993, the fragile unity began to disintegrate.  The political turmoil 
surrounding the 1993 parliamentary results was nearly rectified by a coordinated effort 
from within the government.  The National Dialog of Political Forces made up of 
“respected northern elites” developed a solution to the crisis via the Document of Pledge 
and Accord.74  This agreement “called for further limits to executive power, a bicameral 
legislature, and greater decentralization of power.”75 If enacted, this agreement would 
have resulted in greater representation for the southern based YSP, and less influence 
from the executive branch.  As it was, the government’s executive branch was comprised 
of a Presidential Council of five members selected by the House of Representatives.76
 Not only had the South lost militarily in the civil war, but they were also 
decimated politically through constitutional amendment.  Instead of amending the 
constitution to decentralize power, as proposed by the Document of Pledge and Accord, 
the 1994 amendment consolidated power with the president and diminished the influence 
  
Since the YSP only received 18% of the seats in the House due to the disproportionately 
small size of the southern electorate, they were only able to hold two out of five positions 
on the Presidential Council.  The widespread support for the Document of Pledge and 
Accord became irrelevant after the civil war broke out in May 1994.  Yet the original 
constitution, and the governing body’s willingness to amend it in order to provide a more 
pluralistic democracy, proved that the Republic of Yemen has the capacity and 
foundation for a responsive and effective democracy if left unhampered. 
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of the House of Representatives.  “The amendments abolished the Presidential Council 
and broadened the powers of the president.  The Presidential Council, which in the 1991 
constitution was a five-member body elected by the parliament, was replaced by the 
Consultative Council (Majlis al Shura), whose 59 (now 111) members are appointed by 
the president.”77  The amendments which were ratified in September 1994, only two 
months after the guns fell silent in the civil war, changed a total of fifty two clauses and 
added twenty nine.78  In addition to the political changes, the socially progressive legal 
code adopted from the YSP was deleted.79 The changes to the constitution were a 
deliberate step by President Saleh and the GPC to marginalize the YSP after the war.  
The resulting government was a pluralistic authoritarianism with Saleh ruling over the 
country with little if any political opposition.  From 1994 onward, President Saleh 
presided over a robust patronage system which drained the resources of the south.  As 
stated by Sarah Phillips, “[t]he consolidation of the patronage system is one of the most 
important legacies of the postwar period and probably the most antithetical to the 
development of democracy.”80
 The Republic of Yemen’s initial constitution, along with the amendments 
proposed by the Document of Pledge and Accord, gave Yemen the framework for a 
pluralistic democracy but it was ‘shelved’ in order to eliminate political influence from 
the South.  Current U.S. and international policy toward Yemen makes two assumptions:  
first, that a decentralized form of government needs to be created; and second, that Ali 
Abdullah Saleh wants help with creating a decentralized government.  The reality is, as 
discussed above, a more decentralized form of government already exists, but was 
shelved intentionally by Saleh.  Therefore it may be flawed thinking to assume that he 
wants to dust off the old constitution and give his southern rivals equality in governance 
once again.  The existence of a multi-party political system may appear to be a promising 
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harbinger of reform, but as long as Saleh is unwilling to share power with southern 
leaders, the pluralistic government will continue to be unresponsive to the 
disenfranchised South. 
B. YEMEN’S POLITICAL PARTIES 
The political parties which occupy the Yemeni House of Representatives have 
been used to present a “veneer of Democracy” to the population and the international 
community.81  Even though the Republic of Yemen has the framework for a pluralistic 
democracy, President Saleh and his ruling party in parliament choose to maintain a highly 
centralized, authoritarian form of government.  The GPC has remained an umbrella 
political party for those loyal to the president, and it has run into little opposition since 
the 1990 unification; with only the YSP offering a miniscule voice of dissent in the 
government.  Ironically, in an effort to eliminate political opposition from the YSP 
shortly after unification, Saleh helped create the Islah party (or Reform Gathering).82  
Not only did Islah help counter Saleh’s most potent rival, but it also bolstered the image 
of a pluralistic democracy.  Less than a decade later Islah would ally itself with YSP and 
a grouping of other diverse political parties, to form the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) 
coalition. The emergence of the JMP in 1997 is evidence that the seeds of democracy 
planted in 1990 are still able to break through and challenge the divisive rule.  The JMP 
has given Yemen its most influential and effective opposition group so far.83
 Opposition to Saleh and his ruling GPC party has been hard to come by since the 
unification in 1990.  The president’s first attempt at covering up the absence of a truly 
democratic system was to develop the Islah party as an alternative to the GPC umbrella 
  Yet even 
with the opposition, President Saleh has been able to manipulate the institutions of 
government in order to consolidate power in the North. 
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group, and to counter the YSP from the south.  Yet Islah was almost as loyal to Saleh as 
the GPC.  The party was primarily made up of northern tribal elite, as well as Islamists 
from the Muslim Brotherhood who were extremely hostile to the YSP; and as will be 
discussed in a later chapter, certain factions within Islah even rallied veterans from the 
Afghan war to fight the YSP in the 1994 civil war.84
Islah was led by one of the most influential northerners in the country, Sheik 
Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar.  His position as leader of the Hashid tribal 
confederation, which includes President Saleh’s Sanhan tribe, gave him the ability to 
speak against the government without repercussion, but his political loyalties always 
ended up with the president.
   
85
The unexpected union between Islah and YSP in 1997 produced the first 
legitimate opposition group which could effectively challenge President Saleh and the 
GPC.   Islah and the YSP’s coalition came to be called the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) 
and also included several minor parties, including a conservative Zaydi group from the 
North, as well as Ba’athist and Nasserist groups.  The broad aims of the group included 
the “establishment of a democratic approach toward realization of freedom, pluralism, 
rule of law, peaceful rotation of power, and respect for human rights;” With an over-
arching goal of “protection of the democratic life in Yemen.” 
  The coalition government formed between Islah and GPC 
prior to the civil war was meant to counter the opposition posed by the YSP; but after the 
civil war there was an interesting turn of events which led to the formation of a valid 
opposition group in the Yemeni Parliament. 
86
                                               
84 Steven Day, “Updating Yemeni National Unity,” 421;  Michaelle Browers, “Origins and Architects 
of Yemen’s Joint Meeting Parties,” 569. 
  This surprising coalition 
was meant to bring back the democratic aims which were expected during the initial 
unification of the two Yemens.  The JMP had unexpected cohesion all the way through 
the 2006 elections, but despite their desire to bring validity to Yemen’s pluralistic 
democracy, they were still not able to overcome the influence of President Saleh and the 
GPC.   
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Although influential members of Islah including Sheik al-Ahmar, still tended to 
back the northern-leaning leadership of Saleh, moderates within the party were able to 
partially revive the democratic process.  The ‘modernist’ wing of the Islah party was an 
especially active group among the JMP, giving the coalition its pro-democratic traction.87  
Three men associated with this wing, Muhammad al-Yadumi, Abd’ al-Wahhab al-Anisi, 
and Muhammad Qahtan, were particularly vehement in their opposition to the GPC and 
President Saleh.  After the 2003 parliamentary elections Qahtan and al-Yadumi were 
especially boisterous in their critique of the ruling party.  The elections were considered 
to be fraudulent, as the GPC captured an astonishing 229 out of 301 seats in the House.88  
Qahtan directly addressed President Saleh by exclaiming, “You, president, were the 
reason behind this problem, yet it will never be solved [the issue of democracy] if you 
don’t want to solve it.”89
The resiliency of the JMP as an opposition force shows signs of hope for Yemen’s 
democracy, but as President Saleh and the GPC continue to stunt the development of 
decentralized government the opposition may begin to crumble.  The extent of the JMP 
ability to remain united was evident during the presidential elections in 2006.  The group 
successfully navigated three divisive moments during the election.  First, they were able 
to agree on a credible and popular candidate to run in opposition to the president, and 
then get approval for his candidacy from the ruling party. After the nomination, the 
administration began to balk at the agreed upon election date, creating a debate within the 
 While the JMP gave Yemen’s government a nascent opposition, 
it is clear by Qahtan’s comments that President Saleh continued to suppress the formation 
of a truly democratic government.  The JMP’s performance leading up to, and after the 
2006 elections showed just how close the opposition can come to changing the political 
landscape in Yemen, and presents a potential ally for U.S. efforts at reform. 
                                               
87 The term “modernist wing of Islah” is coined by Francois Burgat, “Yemen:  On Which Side?”  Le 
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JMP of whether to boycott the election entirely.90 To their credit, the JMP stayed united 
and carried on with the election process.  In the end the JMP candidate, Faysal bin 
Shamlan, received twenty-two percent of the vote; while seemingly low, it was an 
astonishing feat considering that the election process gave a clear advantage to Saleh.  
Although the EU considered the vote valid, they noted fraud in many areas and 
denounced Saleh’s use of state resources for his campaign, including “unequal access to 
the media, the perception of partisanship in electoral administration, and serious gender 
bias.”91
Recent events within the Yemen government have stretched the JMP unity to its 
limits, as President Saleh continues to obstruct the democratic process.  The 
parliamentary elections which were schedule for 2009 were delayed for two years and are 
on the verge of being postponed once again.  The JMP’s attempts to reform the electoral 
process have met with bureaucratic roadblocks which some members of the JMP argue 
are a deliberate attempt by Saleh to delay the elections, “It is not in the ruling party’s best 
interest to have the elections on time since its popularity is suffering in many 
governorates around the country.”
Despite the seemingly unfair election process, the JMP continued to participate in 
the government rather than boycotting or dividing.   
92 If the April 2011 elections are pushed back, the JMP 
has threatened to boycott, 93
The foundations of democracy are in place in Yemen, but their growth and 
development have been constrained through the actions of President Saleh and the GPC.  
The JMP provides a viable opposition but they are unable to break through the glass 
 giving Saleh and the GPC what they want; uncontested 
elections to provide a veneer of democracy to a pluralistic authoritarian government. Top 
level discussions between the U.S. and JMP leadership could help to legitimize the 
opposition and essentially ‘call the bluff’ of President Saleh. 
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ceiling within the government, as the ruling party maintains a tight grip on power.  The 
image of democracy has been used by the Saleh regime in order to bring in international 
support, including foreign aid.  Yet this aid only helps to entrench President Saleh’s vast 
system of patronage which has become the true shadow government within Yemen.94
C. PATRONAGE IN YEMEN:  A SHADOW GOVERNMENT OF 
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
The patronage system in Yemen is the most immovable obstacle to the U.S. strategy 
toward Yemen.  It has given President Saleh a complex web of control which cannot 
easily be reworked in order to be inclusive to his traditional foes in the South.  As long as 
the system is in place, foreign aid including security assistance will go towards its 
function.  While the U.S. posits that better government capacity will take the place of 
patronage, this presumes that President Saleh and the northern tribal elites are willing to 
change for the benefit of the South.  As revenue dries up, Saleh fortifies the patronage 
network with foreign aid money, and uses military aid to suppress internal dissent from 
the areas which are marginalized.  The Southern Movement in particular has become a 
grievance based revolt, where the unjust practices of the patronage system are an issue of 
dispute.95
The neopatrimonial system in place since unification has provided President Saleh 
a set of informal institutions which have taken the place of democratic institutions run by 
the central government.  This shadow government has favored the northern tribes; the 
Hashid confederation in particular.  By co-opting the tribes, whether northern or 
southern, Saleh has been able to outsource key government functions such as security and 
justice.  While bringing in over 4,000 tribal sheiks under his patronage, the president has 
been able to cast a wide net of influence over Yemen.  The net had also covered the 
  In response to the separatist movement the Saleh regime has responded with 
military force, some of which provided by U.S. security assistance.  The northern 
controlled military apparatus has only exacerbated the suppression of the South.  This 
illustrates the dangers of building up Saleh’s security sector prior to reforming the 
political system. 
                                               
94 Sarah Phillips, Evaluating Political Reform in Yemen, 9. 
95 Steven Day, “The Political Challenge of Yemen’s Southern Movement,” 7. 
 44 
South where Saleh has intentionally revitalized tribalism; but as the resources disappear, 
the State’s influence is receding back to Sana’a.  The southern elites are now working 
outside of the patronage system which has maintained the status quo since the civil war.  
The decline of the oil based economy has caused the patronage system to recede, but as 
long as money and aid comes into the government, President Saleh will maintain his 
shadow government despite the threats of revolt at the periphery. 
As the country’s resources begin to dry up Saleh has begun to consolidate power 
around his tribe and family, while at the same time using a “divide and rule” strategy in 
southern Yemen in order to divert revenue to the North.96
 Despite the references and classifications of Yemen as a “weak state,” the 
informal institutions which make up the patronage system give the president all the 
control he needs to rule Yemen. The vast patronage system run by Saleh constitutes an 
alternative form of government in Yemen, and it gives the president a form of control 
over events within the country.  The democratic institutions within the government are 
used as both a “window dressing” of sorts, as well as a “holding bin” for individuals 
which Saleh does not wish to have in more influential or threatening positions.
 The grievances caused by this 
strategy have resulted in open insurrection in the South, thus widening a rift which is 
being exploited by secessionists and AQAP.  Despite the diminishing resources and the 
regional divisions, the informal institutions still provide a powerful tool for Saleh to 
control the events in Yemen, thus making the State stronger than it would otherwise 
appear.   
97  This 
political patronage tends to appease rival groups but it also diffuses their power.  In 
addition to providing the façade of a pluralistic democracy, the political institutions are 
also used to distribute patronage amongst the tribal, military, and business elites.  The 
GPC in particular has been known to be a central administrative branch for the patronage 
system, thus giving the president the capacity to manage such a complex system. 98
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To say that Saleh’s tribal patronage system is “vast” may be an understatement.  
There are 4,000 to 5,000 tribal sheiks on the government’s payroll, each expected to tow 
the line of the president.99  These tribes make up a dispersed shadow government for 
Saleh which compensates for the lack of strong government institutions throughout the 
country.  As stated by Sarah Phillips, “the Yemeni regime has actually encouraged the 
move away from its own institutions.”100
The patronage system has provided the State a solid power base, without having 
to rely on formal institutions.
 
101 In the case of President Saleh, he has used the patronage 
system to enhance his direct influence in the areas of justice, and security.  His 
manipulation and cooperation with the tribes of both North and South, has given Saleh 
the ability to maintain his control of the country without ceding power to the democratic 
system.  The State’s interaction with the tribes, especially through the patronage system 
is the key to understanding how Yemen has not as of yet declined into a failed state.  
Additionally, by understanding his strategy of “coercion, co-optation, and 
fragmentation,” it is easy to see how AQAP can fill the vacuum of power left by the State 
if certain areas, such as in the South, are marginalized.102
1. Cooptation of Security Through the Patronage System 
 
 It has been noted that Yemen is a weak state because it does not hold the 
monopoly on violence within its borders, but this assumes the framework of a non-
patrimonial state.  Instead of using the State’s security forces to coerce rebellious tribes, 
which Saleh has shown he can do, he often relies on the cooptation of tribes in order to 
nullify internal security threats.103
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 In an interview for Abu Dhabi Television, President 
100 Ibid., 103. 
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Saleh was quoted as saying, “I have one and a half million tribesmen who, on my 
command will mobilize with their own guns and ammunition.  What use do I have for 
[soldiers] who…are being stomped in the streets.”104 But while Saleh may have the 
ability to call on his tribal patrons, the truth of the matter is that he uses tribal rivalries to 
slowly grind down any ability the tribes may have to attack the state.  By the ‘divide and 
rule’ or a fragmentation strategy, the president is able to limit the power of certain tribes, 
especially in the South.105
   In contrast to developmental funds, security assistance by way of 1206 funds has 
been applied to specific areas within Yemen’s military complex.  In a hearing before the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman could not pinpoint where aid 
money was specifically going in Yemen, other than to say that the money was going to 
USAID, not directly to the government of Yemen.
 In contrast to his divide and rule strategy in the South, Saleh 
has helped empower the Hashid tribal confederation, and his own tribe in particular.  This 
has allowed a robust and loyal State security apparatus to exist; but not the type of 
security sector which would promote “transparent” or “responsive” governance. 
106  Yet on the security side, 1206 
funding for counterterrorism efforts has been earmarked for air force assets with 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, as well as helicopters 
and the supporting maintenance packages.107  Additionally, security assistance from the 
U.S. has been used for training Yemeni Special Forces and counterterrorism 
units.108
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While in the U.S. frame of reference the training and equipment is a tool to 
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counter AQAP; but the structure of Yemen’s military and its leadership, gives reason to 
believe that these assets will be used to counter their internal enemies which are more of 
a priority, such as southern separatists. 
 In short, the patronage system as applied to the military complex in Yemen does 
not serve U.S. efforts against al Qaeda.  The assumption inherent in U.S. strategy toward 
Yemen is that building Yemen’s security apparatus is essential in shrinking ‘ungoverned 
spaces’ and combating AQAP.  But strengthening President Saleh’s security apparatus is 
a dangerous road to take. 
The patronage system within the military complex has consolidated around the 
Saleh family and their tribe, thus further alienating and marginalizing groups on the 
periphery.  Key army positions have been awarded to members of Saleh’s Sanhan tribe; 
and more alarmingly, the president is lining his inner circle of military commanders with 
members of his own family:  his son, Amhed is head of the Republican Guard, while his 
nephews Tarik and Yahya control central security services in charge of protecting Sana’a 
and the regime.109 This has produced fears that the democratic process of electing a 
successor to the president will be pushed aside in favor of Saleh family rule.  The military 
patronage is another example of how the government institutions are looking less like a 
democracy and more like an autocracy.  In addition to the family-centric military 
postings, the president has favored northern tribes in his patronage system while keeping 
southern tribal leaders and business elites at arm’s length.  As the economy has started to 
dry up, so has the patronage system in the South, thus driving an even larger wedge 
between the government and the southern tribes.110
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2. Divisive Patronage in the South 
 Subsequent to the civil war in 1994, President Saleh had deliberately revitalized 
tribalism in the South in order to widen his power base.111  As with the northern tribes, 
co-optation of the southern tribes helped to build a set of informal institutions in lieu of 
government run processes.  Once the patronage system was in place the once strong legal 
system of the PDRY was intentionally usurped by tribal law.112 Additionally, tribal 
networks were relied upon to check the power of the YSP, which was still a threat to the 
GPC and Islah.  But even with their usefulness to the government in Sana’a, southerners 
were still considered a political threat.  As a consequence of the civil war, patronage 
became a ‘divide and rule’ tactic against the South. 113
As the economy, and especially oil revenue, begins to dry up, the southern 
population has gotten less and less from the central government; through the patronage 
system or otherwise.  Saleh’s consolidation of patronage in the North, and the years of 
manipulation of the South have produced a number of grievances which threaten the 
status quo of the informal institutions set up by the president.  April Longely Alley notes 
that more and more tribes, as well as the urban business class in Aden, have begun to 
operate outside of the patronage system to set up grassroots movements which demand 
fair treatment and the mediation of grievances.
  
114
D. RELEVANT INSTITUTIONS IN THE PATRONAGE SYSTEM 
 The failure of the State to address these 
grievances outside of the patronage system, gives Islamist militants the opportunity to 
exploit the rifts between the State and the marginalized southern tribal networks.   
The once promising oil revenues which helped to spur unification in 1990 are 
quickly drying up, thus amplifying the many woes of Yemen.  What little revenue Yemen 
receives from its flagging oil assets has disappeared into the patronage abyss created by 
President Saleh.  The budgetary powers given to the democratically elected House of 
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Representatives have been siphoned into a centralized program which has allowed the 
president to manipulate the budget as he sees fit.115  In addition to the oil revenue, 
Yemen is relying heavily on foreign aid which has increased substantially in recent years 
due to the presence of AQAP.  Since the inception of the U.S. strategy toward Yemen, 
foreign assistance from the United States alone has jumped from $40 million in 2009, to 
$106 million in FY 2011; not including 1206 security assistance funding.116
 President Saleh has traditionally used oil revenue to retain the neo-patrimonial 
system, but the flagging oil reserves have curtailed his reach.  As the revenue disappears 
the patronage system has been consolidated within the northern tribal elite, leaving the 
South high and dry.  The U.S. seeks to build capacity within the financial institutions of 
Yemen as part of its “two pronged strategy;” but it will be difficult to achieve with 
President Saleh controlling the purse strings from behind the scenes.   
  The 
dispersal of oil revenue, as well as foreign aid, has been integrated into the patronage 
system, therefore reaching only those areas which President Saleh deems necessary.  The 
shortage of oil revenue is only one of many problems faced by the government of 
Yemen; the combination of water shortages and a population explosion has made for a 
volatile mix. 
The financial oversight which was built into the constitution has become another 
window dressing over the past decade.  The Ministry of Finance has traditionally been 
Saleh’s monetary arm within the patronage system.  A majority of government 
transactions have been highly centralized through this ministry, with the minister 
reporting directly to the president.117 The manipulation of the budget from the Ministry 
of Finance reflects the authoritarian nature of the administration, and highlights the fact 
that the Ministry is “the president’s cashier.”118
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balances within the government are meant to create transparency, as Article 89 of 
Yemen’s Constitution states, “[e]very expenditure not provided for in the budget or any 
additional revenue shall only be authorized by law.”119
Tight control of the budget gives President Saleh a coercive tool with which to 
influence events in lieu of military action.
 Of course this is seldom 
observed; funds for the patronage system are not openly discussed, let alone debated on 
the floor of parliament.  
120
 Control of the financial institutions has always stayed in the hands of northern 
officials.  Southerners on the other hand, are never appointed to the post of Minister of 
Finance; therefore they did not have access to the treasury.  In an interview with a former 
member of parliament, researcher Floor Beuming highlights how the northern 
government, the president and the Ministry of Finance in particular, can manipulate the 
financial system to project their influence:  “When Saleh wanted to get something done, 
for example when he had problems with tribesmen and wanted to pacify them, he would 
just send a little note to the minister of Finance signed by him saying ‘give this sheikh 
one million riyals.’  The sheikh would receive it, and problems were solved.  If al-Bidh 
[the southern leader] would sign a note like that, he would get absolutely nothing.”
 Paying millions of dollars to tribal sheiks to 
quell disputes with force is not uncommon. Therefore even if the government cannot 
deploy security forces around the country, President Saleh has the monetary means to 
control the “ungoverned spaces” by way of tribal militias.  The financial institutions, 
many of which take in foreign aid money, are used by the president for these purposes.  
The coercive power of money within the Yemeni system provides Saleh all the 
motivation he needs to make sure that only his most loyal allies have access to the 
economic institutions. 
121
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The northern-bias of the government has certainly agitated the South, especially since 
much of the revenue comes from the country’s largest oil field in Hadramawt 
Province.122
With oil revenue being used to support a divisive patronage system, the foreign 
aid to Yemen may suffer the same fate.  In the coming years Yemen’s financial well 
being will be in the hands of foreign donations.  Yemen’s oil reserves are predicted to dry 
up within the next decade, leaving foreign aid as their primary source of revenue.
   
123 U.S. 
aid in 2010 alone will total $58.4 million, including military as well as developmental 
aid.124
E. CONCLUSION 
While Yemen has the financial institutions to distribute aid, and developmental 
projects to put the money to use, the reality is that those institutions are in part a façade to 
the centralization of the patronage system.   
The analysis of Yemen’s government has revealed two key findings which should 
influence U.S. strategy.  First, the democratic foundations of Yemen’s government only 
provide a façade to the true authoritarian rule of President Saleh.  Even though the 
institutions are in place, and the constitution outlines a vibrant representative 
government, President Saleh has a strong grip on power.  But in recent years the JMP has 
become a viable opposition and has shown the ability to win support from the population, 
especially in the South.  Therefore the U.S. can potentially partner with this group to seek 
reform and mediate grievances in southern Yemen.  Realistically, reform at the top levels 
of government is problematic since President Saleh has not shown a willingness to 
provide transparency or responsiveness.   
Second, the patronage system is the true power base of the Yemeni government.  
President Saleh uses cooptation, coercion and fragmentation as the tenets of his patronage 
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system and he has effectively ruled in this manner since entering office in 1978.125
These conclusions demonstrate the importance of focusing U.S. strategy on the 
populations of southern Yemen, and illuminate the perils of building up the government’s 
security apparatus prior to tangible reforms in governance.  The quick employment of 
security assistance is in contrast to the slow and diffuse application of developmental aid.  
The relatively rapid addition of a well trained Special Forces element, aircraft with 
surveillance capabilities, and additional airpower, has provided the president the means to 
quickly resolve sociopolitical issues with force.  Although the government assures the 
U.S. that its sights are trained on AQAP, the Southern separatists present a more likely 
target.   
  This 
‘shadow government’ is funded through the northern dominated Ministry of Finance and 
administered by the GPC; the two truly ‘relevant’ institutions within the government.  
These institutions have become even more northern-centric as the country’s resources 
have begun to dry up.   The president has consolidated his patronage system in the North, 
providing northern tribes with the bulwark of support and filling the military’s ranks with 
his family and fellow tribesmen.  This has widened the rift in the South and has forced 
tribes and social groups in southern Yemen to work outside of the system to alleviate 
grievances. 
The government of Yemen has often affiliated southern separatist movements 
with AQAP.  Indeed the widening divisions within the country have made the South a 
fertile ground for militant Islamists such as al Qaeda, who use the grievances as fuel for 
the fire.  But how does the radical Islamist ideology of AQAP resonate with the 
population in southern Yemen; or with the northern population for that matter?  Many 
within the U.S. have called Yemen “a breeding ground” for extremists.  But is Yemen 
truly ripe for radicalization?  The following chapter will investigate the place of Islamic 
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IV. ISLAM IN YEMEN:  AN INCUBATOR FOR EXTREMISM? 
The U.S. strategy toward weak states has drawn broad and monolithic 
assumptions about the sociopolitical and socioreligious conditions within such states, 
deeming them ‘incubators’ of terrorism, or ‘breeding grounds’ for militant Islamists.  But 
these assumptions fall short of reality with regards to Yemen.126 The traditionally 
tolerant and flexible nature of the Zaydi and Shafi’i sects of Islam make up the majority 
of Yemen’s population and have a history of coexistence in the country.  Of course this 
does not mean that fundamentalist movements have been absent in Yemen; the Zaydi 
revival which began in the 1990s in the northern governorate of Sad’a is proof of that; but 
there has not been a Zaydi or Shafi’i movement espousing militant Islamist views.  
Yemen is suffering from a multitude of political, economic, and social problems, all of 
which contribute to the country’s status as a “weak state.”127
This chapter argues that the assumptions inherent in U.S. weak state strategy do 
not accurately reflect the conditions in Yemen.  Yemen’s status as a weak state has not 
made it an ‘incubator’ for extremists, rather the government itself has facilitated the 
presence of militant Islamist groups.  To begin, a review of Yemen’s religious 
demographics will provide an overarching picture of the socioreligious makeup of the 
country.  This includes a background of the Zaydi and Shafi’i sects of Islam which makes 
up the majority of the population.  Then, an analysis of President Saleh’s tendency to 
coopt jihadist groups will show how he has facilitated the presence of militant Islamist 
groups within his borders.  After describing the detrimental effects of Saleh’s cooptation, 
 
 
  But does this mean that the 
extremist ideology of al Qaeda has found a popular following in the periphery of the 
country?   
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a description of the impact by Afghan Arabs and their Salafi Jihadist outlook will 
highlight the ideology which many of the coopted militant groups prescribe to; and more 
importantly, the ideology ascribed by AQAP.  
 The analysis will show that Yemen has not become a hotbed for extremist merely 
because it is a weak state with a Muslim population, but because the government has 
facilitated the presence of militant Islamists throughout its history.  Furthermore, the 
analysis concludes that Saleh’s reliance on coercive power to solve political disputes in 
the periphery has provided the southern tribal community two options:  accept the status 
quo and continue to be marginalized, or partner with the Jihadists in order to alleviate the 
suffering.  The U.S. must then adopt two key tenets in its strategy toward Yemen in order 
to provide the southern tribes with a more peaceful option:  first, make a good faith effort 
to directly address the grievances; and second, avoid strengthening President Saleh’s 
means to maintain the status quo through coercion.    
A. A TRADITIONAL COEXISTENCE:  ZAYDIS, SHAFI’IS, TRIBALISM 
AND THE STATE 
 Yemen has long been a traditionally conservative Muslim State; but first and 
foremost it has been a state where tribalism rather than Islamism was a source of conflict.  
The Zaydi Shi’as of the North and the Shafi’i Sunnis which make up the majority of the 
population have coexisted and even worshipped together for nearly 800 years.  The Zaydi 
Imamate, which had controlled the North for centuries, built the foundations of an 
Islamic State, thus providing a tradition of Islamism within the country.  The Zaydi 
Imamate represented a traditionally conservative Islamist state until the Revolution of 
1962.  Yet even after the Republicans took the reins of the nation, Zaydism was too 
intertwined within North Yemen’s tribal society to become politically marginalized.   
Shafi’i Sunnis, much like their Zaydi Shi’a counterparts, took a more 
philosophical interpretation of Islam rather than a literal view.  But unlike the Zaydis, the 
Shafi’is relied less on hierarchal leadership, thus allowing the religion to spread quickly 
and easily throughout the remainder of Yemen.  By the thirteenth century, the traditional 
Zaydi and Shafi’i populations had settled into the regions of the country which they 
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occupy today.128
1. Mutual Tolerance 
 The philosophical rather than literal interpretation of the Quran by both 
of Yemen’s traditional Islamic sects, along with their tolerance for other belief systems, 
has given Yemen a foundation of moderate and tolerant Islamic practices.  Despite being 
a weak state, this foundation of tolerance provides a ‘firebreak’ for the spread of the 
extremist views inherent in militant Islamism. 
The Zaydis have become ingrained in the northern highlands of Yemen providing 
an enduring and traditional form of moderate Islam in the North of the country.  The 
origins of Zaydism in Yemen can be traced back to the 9th century AD when the northern 
tribes of Yemen requested a shi’ite from the Hijaz region to moderate a 300 year old 
dispute. Yahya bin al-Husain answered the invitation, and remained in the northern 
highlands to introduce Zaydi teachings to the tribes of the area.129 Al-Husain created the 
first Zaydi state in 893, which asserted that the rightful leader of the Zaydis should be a 
descendent of the Prophet, and this imam should also be the leader of the state.130  
Maintaining a state in the midst of a fractionalized tribal area was no small feat.  But 
since the religious tenets of the Imamate intrinsically respected the order and tradition of 
the tribes, the Zaydi Imamate was able to survive and flourish among the northern tribal 
system.131
The flexibility and tolerance of the Zaydi sect of Shi’ism has become a defining 
characteristic of northern Yemen.  After being pushed out of its birthplace in northern 




                                               
128 D. Thomas Gochenour, “Towards a Sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen,” in Contemporary 
Yemen:  Politics and Historical Background, ed. B.R. Pridham (New York, NY:  St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 
16. 
 The Zaydis differ from other forms of Shi’ism in both beliefs and 
interactions with outside groups.  Also known as “Fivers” because of their interpretation 
129 D. Thomas Gochenour, “Towards a Sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen,” 8. 
130 Barak A. Salmoni and others, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen, 65. 
131 Ibid. 
132 U.S. Department of State, “International Religious Freedom Report 2008,” 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108496.htm (accessed 20 October, 2010). 
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of the rightful succession of Imams from ‘Ali, Zaydis have traditionally emphasized 
rationalism over literal interpretation of Islam.  They have taken a more tolerant view of 
the Sunnis as well, which has allowed the Zaydis to coexist peacefully with the Sunni 
majority in Yemen since their arrival in the ninth century.133
The Zaydi influence in the north was matched by an equally tolerant form of 
Sunni Islam in the South.  While the Zaydis established a strong and lasting presence 
within the northern tribal areas, the majority of Yemen consists of Sunni Muslims from 
the Shafi’i school of jurisprudence.
 
134 The Shafi’i school was introduced in the southern 
highlands of Yemen in the eleventh century as an alternative to oppressive religious 
rule.135Its lack of hierarchal organization, or a ‘divinely endowed aristocracy,’ allowed 
Shafi’i to spread quickly throughout the rest of Yemen.  Additionally, Shafi’ism gained 
state sponsorship from the Ayyubids who ruled lower Yemen in the 12th century, thus 
adding to its already growing influence throughout the country.136
 Imperial exploitation, followed by post-colonial nationalism characterized the 
modern development of the greater Middle East, yet Yemen has been able to maintain a 
great deal of isolation from European and Western influence.  Therefore the common 
grievances which have brought about the Islamic revival of the late 20th century were not 
necessarily present in Yemen.  The importance of Islam in everyday life was not denied 
by colonial powers or authoritarian regimes.  Both Zaydis and Shafi’is were intertwined 
with society and state since the thirteenth century, forming a tradition of political 
Islamism which would weather both external and internal pressures which sought to 
divorce religion from governance.   
 And like the Zaydis, 
the Shafi’is represented a more open interpretation of Islam, therefore making both 
religious groups tolerant of other beliefs and traditions.  Their moderation and flexibility 
allowed the Zaydis and Shafi’is to coexist without any major sectarian conflict. 
                                               
133 Barak Salmoni, and others, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen:  The Huthi Phenomenon, 
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134 Shafi’i Sunnis make up 55% of the population, see U.S. Department of State, International 
Religious Freedom Report 2008. 
135 D. Thomas Gochenour, “Towards a Sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen,” 15. 
136 Ibid. 
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In essence, Yemen’s unique socio-religious history has shaped how Islam and 
governance have evolved together into a pluralistic style of government which includes 
Islamists as well as socialists; tribal elites and Republicans.  Political Islamism has 
become a featured aspect of the Yemeni government and represents the tolerant and 
moderate nature of the country’s religious background.  Islam has become an integral part 
of governance; helping to create a balance between the authoritarian nature of the ruling 
party, and the traditional background of the citizenry.  The Islah party has been able to 
successfully integrate important aspects of the country’s Islamic background into 
government institutions and law making.  This is illustrated by the deliberate recognition 
of Islam as the sole source of the country’s constitutional legitimacy.137
B. COOPTING JIHADISM:  MILITANT ISLAMISTS ON THE 
GOVERNMENT PAYROLL 
 But just as the 
president has allowed political Islamists to participate in government he has also given 
militants legitimacy as well.  Therein lies the peril of trusting the Saleh regime with 
counterterrorism operations which have repercussions for U.S. national security. 
 The government of Yemen has not only tolerated the presence of Jihadists within 
its borders, but has also coopted them as a militia.  This provides a conundrum for U.S. 
strategists since this particular practice has continued into the era of al Qaeda.  One of the 
tenets of U.S. strategy in weak states, and in Yemen in particular, has been to allow the 
indigenous forces perform counterterrorism operations.  But how vigorously will the 
Saleh regime pursue AQAP if they have a past history of cooperating with militants?  
The government’s cooptation of militant Islamists in the not so distant past seriously 
challenges the assumptions within U.S. strategy toward Yemen.  The background of 
President Saleh’s partnership with Jihadists is an important variable to include in the 
planning and execution of U.S. policy to counter AQAP. 
The Islamic revival, and especially the militant ideas espoused by Sayyid Qutb, 
took root and spread throughout the Middle East during the 1970s and especially in the 
1980s.  Yemen was not exempt from the revolutionary fervor, and militant Islamists in 
the region began to provide the ideology and motivation for Islamists in Yemen.  Groups 
                                               
137 The Constitutions of the Republic of Yemen, Articles 1-5. 
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such as the Islamic Jihad Organization injected Yemen with an extremist strand of 
Islamism which would normally be considered a threat to authoritarian governments; the 
government of the Yemen Arab Republic viewed the groups as an opportunity however.  
The Marxist government of the PDRY was a natural enemy of both the northern 
government and the Jihadists, and during his term as Yemen’s President, Ibrahim al-
Hamdi welcomed Salafi jihadists to fight the communists in South Yemen.  Once 
President Saleh took office in 1978 he continued to direct the militant Islamist fervor 
towards the PDRY. 138
Returning veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War known as the ‘Afghan-Arabs,’ 
added a new and dangerous dimension to the Jihadist movement in Yemen.  The Salafi 
Jihadist movement espoused by Afghan veterans became both a blessing and a curse to 
the government of Yemen.  Regardless, President Saleh was still able to coopt the 
Jihadist forces to once again fight the South during the 1994 civil war.  The continued 
cooptation of the Jihadists in Yemen has facilitated their current ability to mobilize 
within the country.    
  While the militants were melded into the anti-Marxist guerrilla 
groups during the late 70s, many also went to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 
80s.   
The government of Yemen has a long history of coopting Jihadists to fight against 
their opponents in the South.  During the 1960s, North and South Yemen were both 
transformed by revolution leading the two states down very different political and social 
paths.  Even though both the Republican government in the North and the Marxist 
government in the South were natural targets for militant Islamists, the Republicans 
proved to be the lesser of two evils. The Marxist government of the PDRY was a natural 
antagonist for the North and a lightning rod for the Islamists; the Saleh regime had used 
this animosity to their advantage.   
President Saleh has traditionally partnered with two separate Jihadist groups since 
he took office in 1978, setting a trend for the next two decades.  The first was a militant 
                                               
138 For President al Hamdi’s welcoming of the Salafis see Victoria Clark, Yemen:  Dancing on the 
Heads of Snakes, 224, and for President Saleh’s cooption of Jihadists see Jillian Schwedler, Faith in 
Moderation:  Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (New York, NY:  Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
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wing of the Muslim Brotherhood known as the Islamic Front.  This organization was 
headed by Sheik ‘Abd al-Majid al Zindani, a charismatic radical who cooperated with the 
government of Yemen to fight leftist groups within the country.  In particular the group 
was used to fight the National Democratic Front (NDF), which had continually launched 
guerrilla attacks from the South during the 1970s.139  In addition to fighting the Marxists, 
Zindani also played a part in implementing so called ‘scientific institutions’ in North 
Yemen.  These were schools which taught Islamic curricula, but were widely believed to 
be a front for militant training and staging areas for Mujahedeen traveling to Afghanistan 
to fight the Soviets.140
These institutions are still present today.  One of the most notorious, the Al Iman 
University, is thought to be the education and training center for foreign Jihadists 
including Umar Forouk Abdulmutallab, and John Walker Lindh.
   
141  Although suspected 
of being a weapons storage facility in addition to a Jihadist university, President Saleh 
often looks the other way when it comes to enforcing the law.  He also goes out of his 
way to praise Zindani in front of Yemeni crowds while chastising him in front of 
American officials.  Even after being classified as a “Specially Designated Global 
Terrorist” by the U.S. Treasury, Zindani remains unmolested by Yemeni officials.142
The leader of the second group coopted by Saleh played a major part in the 1994 
civil war, and has direct links to al Qaeda.  Sheik Tariq al-Fadhli came from a prominent 
tribal family in the Southern province of Abyan, which was dispersed after the Marxist 
government took over after the revolution.  As a young child, Al Fadhli went into exile in 
  Al 
Zindani and the Islamic Front are just one example of Saleh’s cooptation of militant 
Islamists which ultimately formed ties with al Qaeda. 
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Saudi Arabia, and in 1985 departed for Afghanistan to fight with the Mujahedeen.  While 
in Afghanistan he met and fought with bin Laden and then returned to Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen to start the Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO), which was believed to be funded by 
al Qaeda.143
Al Fadhli and the IJO were first coopted by the government during the 1994 civil 
war, where they acted as the militant wing of Islah, carrying out crippling attacks against 
the leadership of the YSP.
  This organization played a part in welcoming home scores of Afghan 
veterans to Yemen, and nurturing the Jihadist ideology they had picked up in 
Afghanistan.  The Afghan-Arabs would play a major role in radicalizing the Islamist 
movement within Yemen, and their militant skills were put to use by the government as 
well.   
144
 The Zaydi revival in the Sad’a governorate has been a direct response the 
increased cooptation of Salafi political and militant groups by President Saleh.  The 
incursion of Salafist and Wahhabist ideology from Saudi Arabia has been an enduring 
grievance to the Zaydi’s, but the regime’s embrace of militant groups during the civil 
war, and the inclusion of Salafis in politics has became too much for the traditional Zaydi 
factions of Sad’a.
 This partnership illustrates President Saleh’s trend of 
coopting militant groups throughout his rule.  This has led to a dilemma of sorts:  the 
cooptation of the Jihadist groups has become a norm within the government, thus in most 
cases facilitating their existence within the borders of the country.  Also, the ideological 
differences between the Salafi Jihadist groups and the Zaydist and Shafi’ist tribal 
populations have threatened the tribal support base for Saleh.  The Houthi rebellion in the 
North has been the result of political, economic and social grievances, but the religious 
aspect of the revolt is clearly a challenge to Saleh’s continued support and cooptation of 
Salafi elements in the North. 
145
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  The Houthi family, which had played an active part in government 
as part of the Zaydi derived al-Haqq party, took a pivotal role in the Zaydi revival as both 
144 Ibid. 
145 Barak A. Salmoni and others, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen, 96. 
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political and religious advocates.  The revival’s anti government fervor was directed, 
among other things, toward the increased influence of the Salafis in government.   
While the Houthi rebellion has many causal factors, the most significant to this 
study is its anti-Salafi element.  This is by no means a small matter considering the 
religious ideology of AQAP.  An even more significant point from this uprising is that 
the forceful reaction by the Saleh regime would not have been possible without the U.S. 
security assistance which was provided for counterterrorism purposes.  A Rand study of 
the Houthi rebellion acknowledges that government’s decision to solve the dispute by 
force was due to its increased military capacity provided by the U.S; the report states, 
“As the scales of coercive power seemed to tip ever more in the [Government of 
Yemen’s] favor, U.S. aid to Yemen may have convinced Saleh he could rearrange 
relations between the [Government of Yemen] and the periphery.”146
1. Salafi Jihadism and the Afghan Arabs 
 This underscores 
the dangers of building up Saleh’s security apparatus prior to political reform.  In this 
case, U.S. training and equipment which was meant to counter al Qaeda, went instead 
towards resolving political disputes with force.  It also weakened a social group which 
was naturally opposed to AQAP’s religious ideology, thus possibly providing space for 
Salafi encroachment.   
The spread of the Salafi movement into Yemen has been both welcomed and 
abhorred.  The government has historically welcomed the Salafi Jihadists who they have 
used to fight the Marxist South and later the YSP.  But the Salafi beliefs and practices are 
not inherently compatible with the Zaydi, Shafi’i, or Sufi sects of Islam residing in 
Yemen.  The Salafi movement is a puritanical approach to Islam where innovative 
interpretations of the Quran are forbidden.  This is in contrast to the more flexible and 
tolerant outlook of the Zaydi and Shafi’i sects which dominate Yemen. While there is 
diversity within the Salafi community, including purists, politicos and Jihadists; the main 
belief is that there is “only one legitimate religious interpretation; Islamic pluralism does 
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not exist.”147
While the purist and politico versions of Salafism are not necessarily violent, the 
Mujahedeen fighting in Afghanistan developed a Jihadist version.  Salafi Jihadists 
populate the ranks of AQAP, and although they are able to coexist in the southern tribal 
areas, in the Zaydi dominated northern tribal territories they do not have the same 
freedom of movement.  In a statement referencing the Houthi rebellion in the North, 
AQAP reveals how the Salafi worldview comes into conflict with a large portion of 
Yemeni society:  “We ask God to allow the defeat of the [Shi’a] rejectionists by the army 
and vice versa so that the Sunnis prevail.”
The Afghan experience helped to infuse a more militant worldview, making 
Salafi-Jihadism the key characteristic of Afghan Arabs and AQAP. 
148 The strict Salafi rejection of man-made laws 
and cultural traditions also sets them on a collision course with southern tribes as well, 
not just the Zaydi North.149
C. CONCLUSION 
 Despite the differences, the Jihadists have managed to 
coexist with the population; but it remains to be seen if they can sustain their tolerance in 
the long run. 
 The nature of the Islamic community in Yemen does not inherently provide fertile 
ground for extremism, but the government’s traditional cooptation of militant groups has 
facilitated radical mobilization.  The Zaydi and Shafi’i sects which make up the majority 
of the Yemeni population have coexisted for hundreds of years without major sectarian 
strife.  But like much of the Middle East, the Islamic revival introduced a more militant 
fervor among some groups.  The rise of militant Islam, and more specifically the return of 
the Afghan Arabs, was embraced by the government rather than condemned.  President 
Saleh has used Jihadists groups in peacetime and in war to disrupt and attack his political 
enemies.  He has taken advantage of their anti-communist fervor to fight the PDRY and 
later to go after members of the YSP during the civil war.  Saleh’s cooptation of ardent 
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Salafi Jihadists such as Zindani has been an alarming trend, and a point of contention for 
the U.S.  The government’s continued partnerships with Salafis has also been proven to 
be a point of contention, as well as a motivating cause for the Zaydi revival in the 
northern governorate of Sad’a.  And while the Zaydi revival may seem as a natural 
firebreak against Salafi Jihadism, the government’s overwhelming military response to 
the Houthi rebellion has alienated the Zaydi population rather than partnering with them 
to stem the rise AQAP. 
 President Saleh’s response to the Houthi rebellion provides paramount and 
tangible feedback on the U.S. strategy toward Yemen.  The military aid provided to the 
government of Yemen for counterterrorism operations has given President Saleh a 
coercive tool which he has used to solve internal disputes.  While Saleh may perceive the 
Houthi family as a threat to his regime, in the end it is a political and social problem.  By 
providing the Yemeni government the tools of coercion prior to implementing the 
reforms called for in the U.S. strategy, President Saleh now has the means and the will to 
solve his political disputes with force.  This does not bode well for the southern 
population which has long standing political and social grievances with the Saleh regime.  
The coercive nature of the government does not provide for a peaceful political 
reconciliation with the South, therefore the population is more apt to be wooed by 
militant groups in order to challenge the government.  AQAP has taken advantage of the 
antigovernment sentiment in order to form partnerships with the southern tribes.  
Ironically, the government’s cooptation of militant groups has facilitated the rise of 
AQAP. 
 It is not surprising then to find that al Qaeda has been able to have a beachhead in 
Yemen.  The following chapter will discuss the rise of AQAP, including the strategy the 
group has adopted to win over the southern population of Yemen. 
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V. THE RISE OF AQAP:  STRATEGIES, FAILURES AND 
SUCCESSES 
The resurgence of AQAP has been an unwelcomed, yet not an unexpected 
development in Yemen.  So far the U.S. government has looked to the usual suspects for 
this phenomenon, such as Yemen’s status as a weak state; the corrupt government of 
President Saleh; ‘ungoverned’ tribal regions; internal rebellion; and chronic economic 
and humanitarian problems.  While these conditions have obviously helped al Qaeda, 
they are not necessarily the reason AQAP has found traction.  As illustrated in the 
previous chapter, militant Islamists have been a part of Yemen’s sociopolitical landscape 
for nearly fifty years.  The Saleh regime has tolerated and even coopted Jihadists in the 
recent past, therefore facilitating their ability to mobilize within the country.  Yet since 
9/11, President Saleh has cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.  Although 
somewhat of a halfhearted effort, Saleh has learned from his mistake in 1990 of failing to 
side with the U.S. in its national security efforts.  Al Qaeda has learned from its mistakes 
as well.  The core leadership of al Qaeda has emphasized a Maoist strategy for its affiliate 
groups; a strategy especially emphasized after the group’s failures in Iraq.150
The recent rise of AQAP is the result of a decade-long series of events which has 
shaped both international politics as well as sociopolitical conditions within Yemen.  This 
chapter will provide a brief background of al Qaeda’s linkages with Yemen over the past 
  AQAP is 
especially suited for this type of strategy in Yemen.  Their successes over the past two 
years illustrate how they have managed to adjust their strategy to navigate the turbulent 
sociopolitical landscape of Yemen.  The group owes its success as much to its strategic 
communication as to the overreliance on ‘hard power’ by the Saleh regime and the 
United States. 
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twelve years.151  The various Jihadists groups in Yemen have coalesced over the years 
into one viable organization which has evolved and adjusted its strategies to effectively 
operate in that country. AQAP’s ability to exploit the grievances of the southern 
population has taken a central role in their Yemen strategy.  Going hand in hand with 
their populist approach to the people of Yemen, AQAP has mastered a strategic 
communications campaign which dwarfs any effort put out by the governments of Yemen 
or the U.S.  Additionally, the relatively small group has also been able to gain support 
and recruits by goading the government and the U.S. into using military force within the 
southern tribal areas.  But despite the effective strategies, AQAP is still vulnerable to 
collapse due to the fundamental differences between Salafi jihadist ideologies and 
traditional Yemeni tribalism.  So far though, AQAP has found its success in the 
cooptation of Yemeni social structures, especially through the southern tribal 
networks.152
A. IN THE BEGINNING:  THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF AQAP 
  This spotlights the fact that the southern population has become the Center 
of Gravity for AQAP; therefore U.S. strategy toward Yemen should strive towards a 
similar goal. 
The official formation of AQAP did not occur until 2009, but al Qaeda affiliates 
in Yemen have been evolving for over a decade.  A series of events spawned by Osama 
bin Laden’s “Declaration of Jihad” against the U.S. in 1996 placed Yemen in the 
crosshairs as a ‘frontline state’ in the so called War on Terror.  The attack on the U.S.S. 
Cole, the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the Saudi purge of al Qaeda 
cells from 2003 through 2008, all shaped the evolution of AQAP in Yemen.  In addition 
to the external events taking place, the continued tolerance of Jihadist groups by 
President Saleh facilitated the continued progress of the group.  There were many events 
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and policies which culminated in a viable al Qaeda affiliate operating out of Yemen.  A 
brief review of the seminal events will illuminate how AQAP has been able to entrench 
itself within Yemen, despite the efforts of the U.S. 
The predecessor to AQAP, known as al Qaeda in Yemen (AQIY), evolved out of 
various Salafi Jihadists groups which had been operating in Yemen for years.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the Afghan Arabs added a volatile mix to the Jihadists 
groups which had already resided in Yemen prior to the Soviet-Afghan war.  Through the 
early to mid 1990s these groups had been coopted by President Saleh to fight his Marxist 
and socialist enemies.  But as the fighting dried up, a few groups had begun to align 
themselves with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.  The initial activity by the al Qaeda 
affiliated groups began in the late 1990s under the auspices of various elements, most 
notably the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA).  While they are thought to have been 
responsible for an attempted attack against U.S. forces transiting Aden in 1992, their best 
known for their involvement in the bombing of the USS Cole.153
The attack on the USS Cole was a defining event for al Qaeda in Yemen, and it 
also revealed the facilitative nature of the Saleh regime. Four years prior to the attack on 
the Cole, Osama bin Laden officially called on all Muslims to attack the United States; 
this “Declaration of Jihad” was a uniting call to the Jihadists in Yemen.
   
154
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 The fight 
against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the government sponsored fight against the 
southern socialists during the 1994 civil war, was now being replaced by a call to jihad 
against the U.S.  Three years after bin Laden’s declaration, members of the AAIA were 
closely coordinating with the al Qaeda leader to attack U.S. warships coming into Aden.  
After a failed attempt in January of 2000 against the USS The Sullivans, a second try 
yielded success for the Jihadists.  The first al Qaeda attack in Yemen was directly 
coordinated by Osama bin Laden himself, and placed Yemen in a new category for both 
the Jihadists and the U.S.   
154 R. Kim Cragin, “Early History of Al-Qa’ida,” The Historical Journal 51, no. 4 (December 2008): 
1047–1067. 
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By October 2000, Yemen was finally patching up its relations with the U.S., but 
the attack on the Cole revealed some alarming, yet enduring truths about President 
Saleh’s relationship with Jihadist groups.  The balking nature in Yemen’s cooperation in 
the Cole investigation only highlighted the ties between President Saleh and the Salafi 
Jihadists within his country.  The FBI investigation was stymied on many levels by 
President Saleh, who reluctantly shared information with U.S. officials about key 
suspects.155Additionally, the leader of the cell which plotted the Cole attack, Abdel 
Rahim al-Nashiri, was given official protection from arrest and was able to travel freely 
throughout Yemen, including Sana’a.  In a subsequent trial it was made public that the 
Yemeni minister of security who oversaw anti-terrorism activities had given an order to 
allow al-Nashiri free passage, as well as cooperation for his operations in 2000.156
The attack on the USS Cole was a major recruiting tool for al Qaeda and it 
became a call to arms for the Jihadists within Yemen.  Nearly two years to the day in 
October 2002, an almost identical suicide attack on the French oil tanker Limburg 
highlighted the continued threat posed by the al Qaeda affiliates.  But the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11 would prove nearly fatal to the Yemeni based militant groups in 2002 and 2003 as 
the U.S. went on the offensive.  President Saleh’s tolerance for the al Qaeda linked 
groups all but vanished after 9/11 as he feverishly attempted to distance himself from his 
coopted Jihadists, lest he suffer the same fate as the Taliban. 
 
The more aggressive stance taken by the U.S. after September 11, 2001, resulted 
in the decapitation of the al Qaeda affiliate in Yemen.  In late 2002, the leader of AQIY 
was killed in a U.S. drone strike, and in relatively quick succession the group’s second in 
command was captured in 2003.  The death of Abu ali al-Harithi and the capture of 
Muhammed Hamdi al Ahdal dealt a severe blow to the nascent AQIY.157
                                               
155 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, 
190-192. 
 While Jihadist 
groups still remained in Yemen, the years following the arrest of al Ahdal were devoid of 
156 Eric Watkins, “Yemen’s Innovative Approach to the War on Terror,” Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 4, 
(February 23, 2005) http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=27598 (accessed 
20 October 2010). 
157 STRATFOR Global Intelligence, “Yemen:  Al Qaeda’s Resurgence,” April 22, 2008, 
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any major activities.  There are several reasons why this lull was taking place.  First, the 
invasion of Iraq and the subsequent insurgency attracted many Jihadists from Yemen to 
fight with militant groups in that country.  A group known as the Yemen Soldiers Brigade 
is said to have sent 300 of its fighters to Iraq, which is a small representation of the over 
4,000 Yemenis which had participated as foreign fighters in the Iraq War up to 2005.158
B. THE RESURGENCE:  LEADERSHIP AND EXPERIENCE IN AQAP 
 
Thus, it can be said that Jihadist activity in Yemen was bound to drop considerably after 
2003.  The decapitation of AQIY’s hierarchy, in addition to the thousands of Jihadists 
flocking to Iraq, led to a false appraisal by the U.S. government however; while al Qaeda 
was momentarily silenced, it was not out of the picture for good. 
The resurgence of al Qaeda in Yemen can be attributed to at least three separate 
events.  First, in February 2006, 23 members of al Qaeda escaped from a high security 
prison in Sana’a; allegedly with the help of Yemeni Security forces.159
The 2006 jailbreak which gave Nasir al Wahayshi his freedom had also breathed 
fresh life into al Qaeda in Yemen.  Al Wahayshi’s background as Osama bin Laden’s 
secretary, as well as his experience fighting with al Qaeda in Afghanistan, gave AQIY a 
new air of credibility.  It is unknown if he had originally planned on coming back to 
Yemen to join fellow Jihadists, but his fate was chosen for him when he was captured in 
The escape proved 
to be a catalyst for the regeneration of AQIY leadership.   Second, the successful Saudi 
counterterrorism sweep which began in 2003 effectively pushed al Qaeda’s Saudi cell 
into Yemen. And finally, the Sunni awakening and the U.S. surge in Iraq had broken the 
back of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), sending a large contingent of fighters back to Yemen, 
providing both experience and numbers.  The combination of experience, manpower, and 
a new core of leadership, has accounted for the strong resurgence of AQAP.   
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Iran and then extradited to Yemen.  After his extradition in 2003, al Wahayshi spent the 
remainder of his jail time in Sana’a with fellow al Qaeda members.  It is probable that 
while in captivity Wahayshi intermingled with Yemeni jihadists, and this facilitated his 
decision to stay in Yemen and start up a new group fashioned after bin Laden’s model in 
Afghanistan.   
The 2006 escape produced two capable leaders for al Qaeda, as Wahayshi was 
joined by his new military commander, Qassim al Raymi.160
The defeat of the al Qaeda insurgency in Saudi Arabia led to an exodus of 
Jihadists into Yemen, providing both manpower and leadership to the newly merged 
AQAP.  The Saudis’ secretive counterterrorism campaign began in 2003 after a robust 
and highly organized network of al Qaeda sleeper cells was called into action by Osama 
bin Laden in order to open a “third front” in the Kingdom.
 After their escape, al Qaeda 
activity in Yemen became more frequent and coordinated. Starting fresh in 2007, the new 
attacks seemed to go after the traditional al Qaeda target sets; western interests and 
Yemeni security forces.  The well planned attacks, along with the addition of a highly 
effective propaganda wing, proved that AQIY possessed the aptitude and organization of 
its northern counterpart in Saudi Arabia which had been embroiled in a violent 
insurgency campaign since 2003.  The Saudis’ successful campaign against al Qaeda 
pushed a good portion of the Jihadists, including leadership figures, south into Yemen.  
Thus, the successful counterterrorism campaign executed by the Saudis, along with the 
failures of the Yemeni security system led to the unplanned merger of the two al Qaeda 
affiliates. 
161
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 By 2008 the insurgency 
was seemingly crushed by the Saudis, who not only used violence to defeat the al Qaeda 
cells, but also ‘soft power’ by way of rehabilitation centers.  One of the recipients of the 
de-radicalization program was Said Ali al-Shihri, who had been released to the Saudi 
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become the deputy to al Wahayshi.162 Following al Shihri were the numerous ‘foot 
soldiers’ of the Saudi insurgency.  There were a number of Yemenis who were a part of 
the Saudi network who no doubt returned to their homeland to resurface in the newly 
merged AQAP.163
The returning veterans of the Iraq War have added an invaluable dimension to 
AQAP; experience.  The presence of the Iraq veterans in AQAP is comparable to that of 
the Afghan-Arabs returning from the Soviet-Afghan War two decades earlier. During the 
1990s the Afghan-Arabs played a significant role in militant Islamist movements 
throughout the Middle East, North Africa and even the Balkans; lending their expertise in 
guerrilla warfare to various insurgencies and civil wars throughout the region.
While AQIY had successfully initiated a new round of attacks within 
Yemen, the infusion of the Saudi leadership and manpower played an integral part into 
the formation and effectiveness of AQAP.  In addition to the surge from Saudi Arabia, 
the hardened veterans of Iraq were returning to Yemen to take up arms with AQAP, thus 
adding to the Saudi numbers and experience.   
164  This 
was the case in Yemen as well, where Saleh continually coopted the veteran Jihadists to 
fight his political enemies.  Iraq has produced the same type of experience and fervor, 
producing a second generation of veterans.  And the numbers returning from Iraq are 
significant; one estimate puts the number at 2,000 Yemeni veterans returning to fill 
AQAP’s ranks.165  It has been widely noted that the return of Iraq veterans has added to 
the quality of AQAP as well; while experience as an insurgent is helpful, the ‘lessons 
learned’ from AQI experience has been just as fruitful, if not more so.166
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 The mistakes 
made by AQI leadership have been incorporated into AQAP’s strategy in Yemen, 
providing for a more tribal-centric approach when dealing with the population; and a shift 
in targeting from high profile attacks to a continuous flow of small scale operations.  This 
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new strategy will be discussed in more detail below.  It is clear to see that the lessons 
learned from Iraq, and the addition of thousands of experienced veterans, has 
significantly impacted the resurgence of AQAP in Yemen.  
The resurgence of AQAP is not the result of one event, or the actions of one 
leader, but the combination of three specific events.  The 2006 jailbreak in Sana’a 
allowed several key al Qaeda leaders escape and emerge as the new leadership of AQIY.  
The newly energized group was able to plan and execute many well organized attacks 
targeting western interests and the government’s security apparatus. While AQIY was 
gaining traction in Yemen, the Saudi affiliate of al Qaeda was reeling from the 
government’s intense counter terrorism operation.  The exodus of the Saudi militants 
ultimately bolstered the ranks of AQIY, and merging into AQAP in January of 2009.  
Thus the leadership of AQAP was comprised of two men, both with ties to al Qaeda’s 
core leadership in Pakistan, and both with extensive experience in Afghanistan.  The 
group’s expertise and experience level was enhanced by the return of thousands of Iraq 
veterans.  The addition of manpower, and a strategy infused with the lessons learned from 
Iraq, led to a violent and effective resurgence of AQAP. 
C. AQAP IN ACTION:  A TRIBAL-CENTRIC STRATEGY 
It is clear by the words and deeds of AQAP that the tribal society of Yemen has 
become the center of gravity in their strategy.  The indigenous nature of AQAP’s 
leadership, as well as lessons learned from Iraq have provided AQAP with a more tribal-
centric strategy, which focuses on identifying with the population’s grievances rather 
than forcing an ideology at gunpoint.167
                                               
167 Ryan Evans provides a discussion on how ‘lessons learned’ from Iraq may have come to shape 
AQAP’s strategy.  See Ryan Evans, “From Iraq to Yemen.” 
 To this end, the strategic communications 
campaign has been an integral part of al Qaeda’s operations in Yemen.  AQAP has been 
able to effectively frame its message through a quarterly publication which serves to 
highlight grievances and present solutions.   Through their messages and actions, AQAP 
has been able to execute a strategy which aims to drive a wedge between the government 
and the tribes; especially in the South.  The strategy has found success and can be 
attributed to lessons learned from the failures of AQI in the Iraq War, as well as the 
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successes in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Yet the indigenous nature of AQAP has also 
facilitated the strategy since many within the leadership, as well as the ‘foot soldiers’ 
have natural ties to the tribal networks within Yemen.  There is no question that al Qaeda 
is an evolving organization which is willing and able to learn from its past experiences.  
AQAP has learned from the best and worst practices of other affiliates in order to find its 
niche in Yemen.  
The strategy of AQAP is reflective of the ideas espoused by al Qaeda’s second in 
command, Ayman al-Zawahiri.  Al Qaeda has adopted a Maoist approach in that they see 
the Muslim community (Ummah) as the center of gravity.168  Al-Zawahiri has made it 
clear on several occasions that their efforts, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Yemen, 
should work within the context of the social norms of the given society.  In other words; 
to live by the rules of whichever society they are attempting to win over.  Al-Zawahiri’s 
correspondence to AQI leader Abu Musab Zarqawi during the Iraq War effectively 
conveys the intent of al Qaeda’s core leadership:  “We will see that the strongest weapon 
which the mujahedeen enjoy—after the help and granting of success by God—is popular 
support from the Muslim masses…So we must maintain this support as best we can, and 
we should strive to increase it, on the condition that striving for that support does not lead 
to any concession in the laws of Sharia.”169
Zawahiri’s message has been absorbed in Yemen as AQAP strives to work within 
the tribal networks of the South in order to gain the support of the ‘Muslim masses.’  
Whether this strategy is born out of the lessons learned from Iraq, or from the cultural 
homogeny between the AQAP cadre and the tribal society is up for debate; but a 
combination of the two propositions seems the most likely answer.   
 
There is credible evidence which points to the indigenous nature of AQAP.  First 
and foremost is the fact that al-Wahayshi is native to Yemen.  Having leadership with an 
understanding of Yemen’s cultural norms and social landscape lends itself to a more 
tribal-centric approach.  In addition to the leadership, there are an estimated 2,000 
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Yemeni jihadists returning from Iraq which can potentially provide a strong core of local 
fighters.  There is no way to tell how many returning Iraq veterans will take up arms with 
al Qaeda, but given the sociopolitical and economic conditions in Yemen, chances are 
that many of these Jihadists will resume their struggle.  Additionally, the returning 
veterans of the Iraq insurgency would surely bring back the lessons they learned and 
apply them to Yemen. 
Al Qaeda’s experience in Iraq was enough to prove how important it is to gain the 
support of the population.  The experience also demonstrated how effective a steady 
campaign of violence can be against an occupying force.  If AQAP has proven anything, 
it is that the organization has learned from the successes and failures of other al Qaeda 
affiliates; AQI in particular.  The lessons learned in Iraq may not be the primary source of 
AQAP’s populist approach, but there are clear signs that the missteps by Zarqawi have 
echoed across the Arabian Peninsula into Yemen.   
Recent analysis has revealed the close link between lessons learned Iraq and the 
current operations of AQAP in Yemen.  The actions of AQI under the leadership of 
Zarqawi are a clear example of a failed strategy which placed ideology ahead of gaining 
support from the population.  As Ryan Evans points out, “maintaining the good will and 
support of the tribes was not a chief concern (for AQI).”170 The result was a strong-
armed approach, including forced marriages, brutal killings, and the marginalization of 
the tribal hierarchy.171As mentioned above, these types of tactics drew harsh rebuffs from 
Zawahiri.  The anti-tribal approach by the AQI leadership ended badly for al Qaeda when 
the tribes revolted in what is now known as the ‘Sunni Awakening.’ Evans asserts that 
AQAP’s actions in Yemen are a result of lessons learned from Iraq; in particular “AQAP 
seeks to co-opt existing social and political structures and genuinely adopt the grievances 
and interests of Yemenis, particularly those in the tribal regions of the country.”172
The tribal-centric approach has also been supported by a deliberate shift in 
targeting methods as well.  Instead of high profile attacks which result in heavy civilian 
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casualties, AQAP has consistently targeted foreign interests and the government’s 
security apparatus.173
1. AQAP’s Strategic Communication Campaign 
 This is in contrast to the high profile attacks in Iraq which tended 
to kill scores of civilians. The hallmark targets of ideology-centric groups such as the 
Taliban or AQI, are absent in Yemen:  attacks on schools, marketplaces and mosques 
which are meant to stir up sectarian violence, or rebuke ‘un-Islamic’ activities, only serve 
to alienate the population.  It appears that AQAP has applied this lesson to its operations.  
It is clear that Wahayshi is in agreement with Zawahiri in his approach toward gaining 
popular support.  The tribal networks of southern Yemen have clearly become AQAP’s 
center of gravity during their resurgence over the past three years. 
What makes AQAP’s resurgence even more effective is their control over the 
narrative.  Strategic communications has always been the strong suit of al Qaeda, and 
they consider it an essential element of their strategy.  This is illustrated by an early 
exchange between Osama bin Laden and the Taliban commander Mullah Omar:  bin 
Laden emphasizes that “the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods (of 
winning over the ummah), in fact, its ratio may reach 90 percent of the total preparation 
for the battles.”174
 One of the most significant developments with AQIY, and later AQAP, was the 
release of the group’s quarterly publication called Sada al Malahim, translated to read 
The Echo of Battles.  This serves as al Qaeda’s model of strategic communication, and 
has defined the nature of the struggle within Yemen.   As Alistair Harris notes, Sada al 
Malahim provides a ‘framework of collective action,’ giving “a diagnosis of the problems 
faced by Yemenis, detailing grievances and apportioning blame.  It also provides a 
prognosis for the future, proposing remedies and redress.”
 AQAP is dominating the ‘media war’ in Yemen by disseminating their 
message through the written word as well as through ‘propaganda of the deed.’  
175
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the population of Yemen, especially the tribal networks and rural communities of the 
South.  Through their magazine AQAP has identified with the grievances of the local 
populations and thus made their collective struggles one in the same.  This is highlighted 
by an article in the March 2009 edition of Sada al Malahim which claims: 
The people of Yemen are suffering from the decline of their living 
standards, the rise of prices, and the discriminatory practices with which 
the government deals with them in employment, the distribution of wealth 
and its looting, the misappropriation of lands, and the absence of someone 
to defend their rights. 
Further into the March edition of the journal, Wahayshi attempts to paint the southern 
tribes as the target of government oppression, stating that military operations in the 
southern provinces of Shabwa, Abyan and Hadramawt were “a step to strike the 
tribes.”176
In addition to framing grievances, AQAP uses its media to announce their intent 
to attack government and western targets.
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 Their ability to carry out the attacks displays 
a high level of planning and coordination.  The group’s ability to announce these attacks 
and then carry them out has provided AQAP with a double-shot of credibility among its 
sympathizers.  It is unclear if the media efforts by AQAP are gaining recruits from among 
the population; as the poorest country in the Middle East, and with the second lowest 
literacy rate in the Arab world, the effectiveness of an online magazine seems 
questionable at best.  What seems more likely is their ability to exploit government and 
foreign military operations which target the already oppressed southern populations.  
Occurrences such as missile strikes or government raids are tangible events that have 
traction within the tribal community.  In a culture where the value of justice is placed 
above all else, and vengeance is a tribal norm; the negative ramifications of an air raid, or 
a violent ‘counterterrorism’ operation, tends to strike a sour chord among the general 
population.  The dichotomy of being the region’s poorest nation, yet outfitted with 21st-
century military might, has gone a long way towards radicalizing the masses.  
177 Ibid. 
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D. THE FAILURES OF HARD POWER 
“We all want revenge.”  The blowback from an overreliance on ‘hard power’ is 
illustrated by this short but powerful statement made by Muhkbil Muhammad Ali, a tribal 
leader in the Abyan province, where 23 people including civilians were killed after an 
airstrike on 17 December, 2009. 178
  U.S. missile strikes and Yemeni military offensives have become fodder for the 
fire in AQAP’s attempts to win over the population.  Just as they have striven to avoid 
civilian casualties, AQAP strives to exploit the collateral damage caused by the U.S. or 
President Saleh’s ‘counterterrorism’ sweeps.  Missile strikes by the U.S. in March and 
December 2009 have been used to frame the U.S. as heartless invaders; while poorly 
executed military operations by the Saleh regime are framed to show the incompetence 
and futility of Yemen’s security apparatus.  The so called ‘Battle of Marib” is an example 
of this phenomenon.   
 The strike only made the tribes sympathize with al 
Qaeda while fermenting animosity towards the government of Yemen and the United 
States.  AQAP did not need a newsletter or video statement to sway the tribes within 
Abyan province, the tangible memory of the air strikes accomplished the same task.   
On 30 July 2009, Yemeni security forces moved against a suspected al Qaeda safe 
haven in the governate of Marib.  The operation fell apart at the seams when a 
‘counterterrorism unit’ mistakenly shelled a tribal house rather than the suspected al 
Qaeda safe house, resulting in a running gun battle between tribal members and the 
Yemeni military.179  Ultimately, the army withdrew leaving behind several dead, and 
seven captured soldiers.  Not only did the al Qaeda cell remain intact and emboldened, 
but AQAP was able to score a coup in their strategic communications campaign with a 
short length documentary.  In the video the narrator states, “A lot of excuses were given 
for this military operation [in Marib] but its main aim was to break the prestige of the 
tribes and to disarm them.”180
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operation, even those which are mounted against southern secessionists.  In even more 
colorful language, Wahayshi used the same narrative after the government’s crackdown 
on protests in the South.   
This military movement mobilizing in Marib, Jawf, Shabwah, Abyan, 
Sana’a, and Hadramaut and which had been obscured in the media, is a 
step to strike the tribes with malicious excuses and shatter their pride, 
disarm them and control their lands, kill their sons, and make it easier for 
the bastard agents and the crusaders to humiliate them.181
AQAP’s narratives frame military action as a threat to tribal pride, autonomy, and an 
attempt to disarm the population.  It also portrays the Yemeni military and government as 
the “shield and belt” of the U.S.; doing the bidding of the U.S. while the people of 
Yemen take the brunt of the damage.
 
182
 The government’s recent use of force in Shabwa and Abyan provinces has only 
aggravated the grievances of the southern population.  In September and October of 2010 
Yemeni security forces conducted raids on to town of Hawta in Shabwa province, and 
Moudia in Abyan, respectively.  While the government claims to be conducting attacks 
against AQAP, their true motivations are suspect by the population.  Many see the 
government’s action as a move against the Southern Movement, especially in Abyan.
 While words may not be enough for AQAP to 
win favor with the tribes, poorly executed military operations, as well as U.S. missile 
attacks which cause heavy collateral damage, have proven to be a more tangible tool to 
sway the population’s opinion. 
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Although the government has more than enough justification for the security sweeps, the 
use of aircraft, tanks and artillery against villages has only added to the anger harbored 
against the government.  The ramifications of this type of ‘hard power’ are described by 
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Professor Fouad Selahy from Sana’a University, “When the government attacks any 
governorate, the young people will retaliate and use weapons against the 
government…The planes are striking their regions, the planes are destroying their homes 
and farms.  These people are not necessarily Al Qaeda.”184
 Yemen’s counterterrorism efforts have been a catalyst for ‘breeding’ AQAP 
recruits and sympathizers in the South.  The demographics and political realities which 
make Yemen a weak state cannot fully be to blame for the rise of AQAP; the over 
reliance on ‘hard power’ by both the government of Yemen and the U.S. has given al 
Wahayshi the perfect tool for recruitment.  Instead of selective targeting, the Yemeni 
counterterrorism efforts have been perceived by the population as being indiscriminant, 
thus mobilizing Jihadism in the lowlands and southern provinces. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
 The characteristics which make Yemen a weak state have provided the backdrop, 
but not the causal factors behind the rise of AQAP.  Many assume that Jihadists groups 
such as al Qaeda use Yemen as a safe haven due to its ‘ungoverned spaces,’ skirting in 
below the government’s radar.  But the State is not as ignorant or as helpless as it seems.  
The evolution of AQAP has been facilitated by the government at times, including the 
cooptation of Jihadists within the State’s security apparatus.  AQAP’s resurgence over 
the past few years can be attributed to three external factors as well; the Iraq War, the 
2006 jailbreak in Sana’a, and the Saudis’ counterinsurgency efforts which aggressively 
pushed al Qaeda into exile.  These three events provided AQAP with the leadership, 
manpower, and experience it needed to form a cohesive group with an organized plan of 
action.  Their tribal-centric strategy has gained traction within Yemen as well.  The 
lessons learned from Iraq, as well as the indigenous nature of the group’s leadership, has 
led AQAP down a more populist path which seeks to adopt the grievances of the tribal 
communities rather than assert a radical ideology.  The comprehensive and coordinated 
strategic communications campaign has signaled the sophisticated nature of AQAP 
planning and execution.  Yet recruits are not flocking to AQAP due to its campaign to 
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win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the ummah, rather it has been the unwise use of ‘hard 
power’ by the government of Yemen and the U.S. which has the southern tribes 
partnering with al Qaeda.  
The U.S. thus has a dilemma in Yemen:  while AQAP has proven to be a threat to 
national security, attempts to eliminate the group have only swelled its ranks, or at least 
provided it with sympathizers.  It is naïve to think that transnational jihadists such as 
AQAP will cease their attacks on the U.S. homeland if the United States drops its 
weapons and picks up a hammer to build schools, hospitals, and a better government.  
But it has been clear that U.S. missile strikes, and Yemeni military action which have 
caused widespread collateral damage, only plays into the hands of AQAP.  In other 
words, al Qaeda and its affiliates are playing chess, while the U.S. is intent on playing a 
game of checkers.  This is illustrated by the cleaver use of strategic communication by 
AQAP, and the complete lack thereof by the U.S.  In discussing this strategic weakness, 
Mari Eder opines, “In the realm of ideas, the United States has failed to make use of what 
is potentially one of its most powerful weapons in the war against terrorism.”185
Yemen will remain a weak state for some time, but that does not mean it has to be 
a “breeding ground for terrorists.”  Smart policy changes can abruptly halt the rise of 
AQAP, and facilitate its fall. 
An 
effective strategic communications campaign also includes action, and military force 
should not be a taboo.  But ‘selective targeting’ and ‘Special Operations’ should be the 
watch-words.  Above all else, by addressing grievances in the South, AQAP’s tribal-
centric strategy will be marginalized, and replaced by a parallel effort from the 
government of Yemen and the United States.  In a strange turn of events, the populist 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The analysis of Yemen’s sociopolitical landscape has shown that the U.S. strategy 
toward Yemen has been based on idealistic assumptions which do not necessarily match 
the true characteristics and conditions present within the country.  The U.S. policy toward 
weak states has been a resolute and enduring tenet of national security strategy for nearly 
a decade.  Yet the strategy’s aim to deny al Qaeda the use of safe havens has hit some 
major hurdles when applied to Yemen.   
The formation of AQAP in January 2009 prompted U.S. President Barack Obama 
to reevaluate and reinvent U.S. strategy toward Yemen.  The result was a “two pronged 
strategy” devised by the National Security Council which focused on building Yemen’s 
capacity for good governance and effective security.  The new strategy was born from the 
“weak state strategy” which has been inherent in U.S. policy since the events of 
September 11, 2001, when it was clear that al Qaeda’s use of ‘under-governed’ territory 
in weak or failing states had become a major threat to U.S. national security.  The tenets 
of this strategy reside in several policy documents, with the 2010 NSS being the most 
recent and authoritative.  The objective of the weak state strategy has been to strengthen 
‘at risk’ states in order to decrease the amount of ‘ungoverned spaces.’  The 
characteristics of this approach include, “information-sharing, law enforcement 
cooperation, and establishing new practices to counter evolving adversaries.”  It also 
states that the strategy is meant “to help states avoid becoming terrorist safe havens by 
helping them build their capacity for responsible governance and security through 
development and security sector assistance.”186
 The “two pronged strategy” toward Yemen is the first attempt at applying the 
weak state strategy to counter a tangible threat from al Qaeda in a country where the U.S. 
does not have a major presence.  The State building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq 
benefit from hundreds of thousands of troops and billions of dollars in developmental aid.  
The task in Yemen is just as immense, yet has only been allocated a miniscule amount of 
All of these characteristics are based on 
the assumption that the governments of weak states were able and willing to cooperate. 
                                               
186 The White House, 2010 National Security Strategy, 21. 
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funding and manpower.  The assumptions present within the two pronged strategy do not 
match the conditions in Yemen and therefore pose a major problem to the U.S. strategy to 
counter AQAP. 
 The strategy crafted by the NSC to counter AQAP is comprised of two elements:  
First, to “strengthen the Government of Yemen’s ability to promote security and 
minimize the threat from violent extremists within its borders.  And second, to “mitigate 
Yemen’s economic crisis and deficiencies in government capacity, provision of services, 
transparency, and adherence to the rule of law.”  The strategy also notes that “as Yemen’s 
security challenges and its social, political, and economic challenges are interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing, so U.S. policy must be holistic and flexible in order to be effective 
both in the short and long term.”187
 The analysis of Yemen’s contemporary history and its sociopolitical conditions 
has proven that the assumptions resident in the U.S. strategy toward Yemen need to be 
revised.  This study presents two overarching propositions which should guide U.S. 
strategy toward Yemen.  First, building Yemen’s security capacity prior to achieving 
political reform only gives President Saleh the ability to widen the rifts in the South, thus 
giving AQAP the ability to capitalize on their grievance-based approach.  The surge of 
U.S. security assistance to Yemen has strengthened the military arm of President Saleh’s 
authoritarian government, thus providing him with the ability to solve political problems 
with force rather than through diplomacy or reform.   
Considering the resources available, and the 
sociopolitical landscape of Yemen, this “two pronged strategy” is overly idealistic and 
based on incorrect assumptions.  First and foremost it assumes that the government of 
Yemen, led by President Ali Abdullah Saleh, shares the same security concerns as the 
U.S.; and more fundamentally, it assumes that President Saleh is willing to transform his 
government to be transparent and responsive to the entire population.  As this study has 
shown, these assumptions do not hold true in Yemen. 
The second proposition asserts the tribal areas and the population of southern 
Yemen are the center of gravity in the struggle against AQAP.  Therefore, U.S. strategy 
should focus on a grassroots approach to building capacity.  This does not mean 
                                               
187 House Committee, Yemen on the Brink, 10. 
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forsaking the central government of Yemen, rather making the resolution of southern 
grievances the primary focus of the effort.  This includes partnering with leaders of the 
Southern Movement and the tribal elite in the disputed areas in order to move toward 
political reconciliation.  The tribal communities in the South have become the Center of 
Gravity for AQAP; therefore the U.S. should direct its attention towards gaining tribal 
support and participation in local government.  Tribal partnerships are the foundation of 
good governance in Yemen.   
 These propositions are based on the analyses of four aspects of Yemen’s 
sociopolitical landscape.  First, the historical analysis of Yemen’s formative periods has 
shown the enduring nature of the country’s divisions; second the examination of its 
governmental structure and institutions, both formal and informal, has revealed how 
President Saleh has used democracy as a façade, and how his vast patronage system and 
family-centric military complex can benefit from foreign aid and U.S. security assistance; 
third, the investigation of the country’s socioreligious structure has highlighted the 
improbability of the country becoming an “incubator” for extremism; and finally the 
analysis of AQAP’s history and strategy in Yemen has uncovered the motivations, 
strengths and weaknesses of the group which is the true target of U.S. strategy.   
A. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
 The review of Yemen’s history reveals that three formative periods have come to 
define the sociopolitical landscape in the country, especially its North-South divide.  The 
period of Imperialism from 1871–1918, reveals the origins of the political powerbase in 
the North, and the integrated nature of tribal society within state governance.  This period 
also uncovers the manipulation of the southern tribes by the British during their rule in 
Aden.  Underlying this whole timeframe were the spheres of influence between the 
Ottoman and British empires which produced a tangible border between North and South.  
The revolutionary period from 1962–1970 further divided the two Yemens as the North 
followed Nasser into the realm of Arab Nationalism while the South transformed into a 
Marxist state following the British departure from Aden.   
The unexpected unification of the two Yemens in 1990 began the last, but most 
influential era in Yemen’s history.  The union of political and economic convenience set 
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the wheels of democracy in motion but ended in an authoritarian state as President Saleh 
and the northern dominated government failed to reconcile with the southern leadership.  
The civil war and its repercussions were the culmination of these three formative, yet 
divisive periods in Yemen’s history.  They illustrate the vulnerability of the southern 
population to a more powerful northern government, and show that President Saleh is 
prone to use force to solve his political dilemmas. 
B. POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
 The examination of President Saleh’s government after the civil war provides 
three main points.  First, the democratic institutions created after unification have become 
a veneer of pluralistic governance in Yemen.  After the civil war President Saleh 
effectively marginalized the YSP by first creating the Islah party, and then amending the 
constitution after the civil war to consolidate power within the executive branch.  The 
second point revealed by the examination of Yemen’s government is that President Saleh 
has formed a shadow government comprised of a vast patronage system which is meant 
to coerce, coopt, and fragment the various political, religious and social groups which 
threaten his rule.  And finally, President Saleh has consolidated his power by staffing the 
most powerful elements of the military complex with his own family members and 
tribesmen. The nature of Yemen’s government makes it clear to see that President Saleh 
does not benefit from initiating broad based reforms to increase transparency and 
responsiveness in his administration.  This then challenges the idealistic assumptions 
within U.S. weak state strategy, and the “two pronged strategy” in particular. 
C. SOCIORELIGIOUS ANALYSIS 
Further assumptions within the strategy assume that weak states are ‘breeding 
grounds’ for extremism.  The analysis of Yemen’s socioreligious background and 
ideological leanings has exposed two key findings:  first, the Zaydi and Shafi’i ideologies 
adhered to by the majority of the population are characterized by tolerance and flexibility 
and are therefore anathema to the Salafi ideology espoused by AQAP.  Second, it has 
been the cooptation of militant Islamists by President Saleh which has facilitated the 
spread of extremism within the borders of Yemen.  This goes against the assumption in 
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U.S. strategy which asserts that the lack of control by the government allows extremism 
to thrive; while in this case the government has coopted extremism, thus facilitating its 
presence.  President Saleh’s historical cooptation of militants to fight internal political 
battles has only recently come to an end with the rise of AQAP, but his use of jihadists in 
the recent past has certainly facilitated that group’s existence. 
D. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF AQAP 
Finally, the analysis of AQAP has revealed that the group has effectively made 
the southern population the Center of Gravity within its populist strategy.  Instead of 
basing their actions and alliances on ideology alone, the group has focused on 
accommodating tribal norms and exploiting the rift between the southern population and 
the northern government.  Their strategy has been formulated from lessons learned in 
Iraq, but it is also a product of the indigenous nature of the group’s leadership.  AQAP’s 
ranks are also filled with veterans from Iraq which provide the group with a foundation of 
experience exceeding that of the Afghan Arabs from the previous generation.  In addition 
to their constant flow of attacks, a prolific strategic communication campaign has been at 
the heart of AQAP’s strategy; the overreliance on ‘hard power’ by the U.S. and the 
Yemeni government has only added to the campaign’s effectiveness.  The unwieldy 
actions by President Saleh’s newly bolstered counterterrorism force, as well as U.S. 
missile strikes in the southern governorates, have only added to the grievances which 
AQAP expertly exploits. 
 The analysis of Yemen’s sociopolitical landscape has shown that the current U.S. 
strategy to counter AQAP is based on overly broad and idealistic assumptions.  A 
strategy which adheres to the propositions offered by this study will result in a more 
targeted approach which would focus on resolving grievances in the South, and place the 
counterterrorism efforts under U.S. control. 
E. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 This study has shown that U.S. strategy toward Yemen should impart two 
underlying assumptions.  First, it should assume that building up President Saleh’s 
security apparatus prior to accomplishing political reform will only further entrench the 
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authoritarian regime, thus providing AQAP more traction with its populist approach.  
Second, the strategy should presume that the Center of Gravity in the fight against AQAP 
is the population of the South.  With these assumptions in mind, strategy toward Yemen 
should be defined by short term and long term objectives.  Obviously the immediate 
threat to the United States should be addressed first. 
1. Recommendations for the Short Term 
In order to counter the immediate threat posed by AQAP, the U.S. should employ 
Special Operations Forces (USSOF) instead of Yemeni forces in order to effectively and 
efficiently disrupt AQAP leadership.  Instead of training and equipping the security 
apparatus of the authoritarian state, the U.S should use the resources, experience and 
expertise of seasoned USSOF units.  U.S.-led Special Operations raids would eliminate 
the collateral damage inherent in airstrikes, or the large scale military operations from 
Saleh’s security forces.  The repercussions of U.S. missile strikes in Abyan, and the 
Yemeni military offensives in Marib and the southern governorates, have led to a 
backlash from the tribal population.  Special operations provide a targeted approach to 
countering AQAP rather than the perceived indiscriminate targeting of conventional 
operations.  They would also be a justified use of force against a terrorist organization 
which has already attacked the U.S. homeland. 
The special operations option would require an added military commitment from 
the U.S., and the acceptance of more risk by the administration.  A robust intelligence 
infrastructure would need to be in place in order to facilitate successful, targeted raids 
against AQAP leadership.  Intelligence assets would need to be diverted from their 
current tasking in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to provide the services needed by 
USSOF.  In addition to diverting assets from other areas of operation, U.S. leadership 
would have to accept the risk involved with placing U.S. forces in harm’s way.  Yet, by 
giving the U.S. the lead in counterterrorism operations, the immediate threat to the United 
States can be effectively disrupted, thus delivering on the resolute intent of denying al 
Qaeda safe haven in weak states. 
Aside from the military aspect, the most immediate sociopolitical concern is to 
address the grievances between the leaders of the Southern Movement and the Yemeni 
 87 
government.  Additionally, the tribal elite of the South should also be brought in to any 
reconciliation discussions.  The Sunni Awakening in Iraq provides an example of what 
can happen when emphasis is placed on political inclusion.  As revealed in the preceding 
study, the southern political and tribal elite have been marginalized by the Saleh 
government; the U.S. should adopt the grievances as their ‘raison d’être.’  Regional allies 
should also help to address the political grievances.  Oman had a part in mediating the 
end of the 1994 civil war and they would provide a more trusted voice to the southerners.  
The immediate and public campaign to address southern grievances would help to deny 
AQAP the support of the population. 
The key to both the counterterrorism efforts and the political efforts lies in solid 
intelligence and a strategic communications campaign.  As head of USCENTCOM, 
General David Petraeus emphasized the importance of robust intelligence and a strong 
strategic communications campaign and admitted the current weaknesses of the U.S. 
effort.  In his Posture Review he notes that Operation Earnest Voice (OEV) is a critical 
part of U.S. strategic communications efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is absent in 
Yemen.188
2. Recommendations for the Long Term 
 A strategic communications campaign is only as good as the actions that back 
it up; a credo which AQAP is living up to with their efforts.  U.S. counterterrorism efforts 
will only work they are in concert with an effective communications campaign.  In 
addition to the strategic communications campaign, the U.S. should employ the full force 
of its intelligence community towards pinpointing key leadership nodes of AQAP in 
order to facilitate U.S. lead counterterrorism operations. 
The U.S. needs to continue its efforts to reform the Yemeni government with a 
long term state building effort. Yemen is a sovereign state and ultimately reforming the 
government will be up to the leadership of the country.  But the U.S. can continue to 
encourage fair and open elections as a means toward reform; reconciliation with the 
South will go hand in hand with these types of efforts.  Reform efforts should be targeted 
and focused towards making sure the political rift between the North and South continues 
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to shrink.  As long as the South remains politically engaged, its grievances can be 
addressed and AQAP is left with little to exploit.   
The analysis Yemen’s government has shown that Constitution of the country has 
provided the foundation for a viable pluralistic democracy.  The political parties are in 
place to provide representation for the people and opposition to the ruling party.  
Opposition to President Saleh has come from the JMP, therefore any work towards 
political reform by the U.S. or the international community should include partnership 
with opposition leaders as well as those from the ruling party.  In order to provide the 
government the capacity for good governance, efforts should be focused on reforming the 
one truly relevant government institution in Yemen, the Ministry of Finance.  Only 
reform at the top levels of Saleh’s patronage system will allow foreign aid find its way to 
local governments; and especially to the southern communities which have been 
marginalized by the patronage system.   
The dangers with electoral reform are twofold:  first, even with fair elections in 
place, Saleh and the ruling party may be voted back in office.  This would give President 
Saleh added confidence to continue with the status quo.  Second, if President Saleh is 
replaced, the disruption of the patronage system prior to economic reforms could cause 
revolts, especially in the North.  Therefore the electoral reforms and economic reforms 
should be a parallel effort. 
In the plethora of policy papers and analyses of Yemen there is mention of the 
endless social, economic, and political problems within the country.  The dwindling 
resources of Yemen have been at the top of that list.  Oil and water are rapidly running 
out, but the U.S. should only be concerned with one of the two:  Water.  The United 
States along with its regional allies should make water projects a marquee effort in 
Yemen. By making a focused effort to solve a problem felt by the entire Yemeni 
population, the U.S. can go a long way in gaining the support of the people in the long 
run.  Although helping Yemen develop natural resources like oil or natural gas would 
help the country’s economy, the perception of the U.S. exploring for fossil fuels would 
only add to the suspicion and give AQAP more ammunition in their ideological fight.  
International efforts to help Yemen conserve and procure water would not only help to 
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win over the southern population, but the northern population as well.  An ambitious 
water project would become a unifying effort, thus thwarting the central tenet of AQAP’s 
divisive strategy. 
 These policy recommendations are based on the assumptions that AQAP is an 
immediate threat to U.S. national security. The recent attempt by AQAP to mail 
explosive devices on U.S. bound cargo planes is a strong indication that this assumption 
is correct.  The recommendations also assume that the government of Yemen, President 
Saleh in particular, is not ready or willing to reform his government into a more 
responsive and transparent institution.  By taking the lead in counterterrorism operations, 
the U.S. can directly confront the immediate threat posed by AQAP, while at the same 
time denying the Saleh regime the means to strengthen his authoritarian rule. 
Additionally, by shifting the focus towards directly addressing grievances in the south, 
the U.S. can help deny AQAP the tribal support it has come to depend on.  In the long 
run, Yemen poses an immense challenge.  As long as efforts remain realistic and 
targeted, the U.S. can stay true to the resolute nature of its weak state strategy and deny al 
Qaeda a viable safe haven in Yemen. 
 90 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 91 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Benjamin, Daniel. U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen.  September 8, 2010. 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2010/147296.htm (accessed November 2, 2010).  
 
Boucek, Christopher. “The Evolving Terrorist Threat in Yemen.” CTC Sentinel 3, no. 9 
(April 2008): 1–4. 
 
Browers, Michaelle. “Origins and Architects of Yemen’s Joint Meeting Parties,”  
International Journal of Middle East Studies 39 (2007), 565–586. 
 
Burrowes, Robert D. “Prelude to Unification:  The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962–1990.” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 23 (1991): 483–506. 
 
Burrows, Robert D. and Kasper, Catherine M. “The Salih regime and the Need for a 
Credible Opposition,” Middle East Journal 61, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 263–280. 
 
Buzan, Barry.  People, States and Fear:  An Agenda for International Security Studies in 
the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition. Boulder, CO:  Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1991. 
 
Carapico, Sheila. “Arabia Incognita:  An Invitation to Arabian Peninsula Studies,” in 
Counter-Narratives:  History, Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen, eds. Madawi Al-Rasheed and Rovert Vitalis, 11–34.  
Gorndonsville, VA:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 
 
Carapico, Sheila.  Civil Society in Yemen:  The Political Economy of Activism in Modern 
Arabia.  New York, NY:  Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
Clark, Victoria.  Yemen:  Dancing on the Heads of Snakes.  New Haven, CT:  Yale 
University Press, 2010. 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of Yemen, Article 82.  May 1991.  http://www.al-
bab.com/yemen/gov/off2.htm (accessed  October 21, 2010). 
 
Cordesman, Anthony and Nawaf Obaid. “Saudi Militants in Iraq:  Assessment and 
Kingdom’s Response.” Center for Strategic and International Studies.  September 
19, 2005. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/050919_saudimiltantsiraq.pdf 
(accessed October 2, 2010). 
 
Cragin, R. Kim. “Early History of Al-Qa’ida.” The Historical Journal 51, no. 4 
(December 2008): 1047–1067. 
 
 92 
Day, Steven. “The Political Challenge of Yemen’s Southern Movement,” Yemen: On the 
Brink. Washington, D.C.:  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March, 
2010. 
 
Dresch, Paul.  A History of Modern Yemen.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
2000. 
 
Ducker, John T., Peter Hinchcliffe, and Maria Holt.  Without Glory in Arabia:  The 
British Retreat from Aden.  London:  I.B. Tauris, 2006. 
 
Eder, Mari K. “The Missing Element:  Strategic Communication.” United States Naval 
Institute:  Proceeding 135, no. 2 (February 2009):  28–31. 
 
Erlanger, Steven. “At yemen College, Scholarship and Jihadist Ideas.” The New York 
Times,  January 19, 2010. 
 
Erlanger, Steven. “Yemen’s Chaos Aids the Evolution of a Qaeda Cell.” The New York 
Times January 3, 2010. 
 
Evans, Ryan. “From Iraq to Yemen:  Al-Qa’ida’s Shifting Strategies.” CTC Sentinel 3, 
no. 10 (October 2010): 11–15. 
 
Gavin, R.J.  Aden Under British Rule, 1839–1967.  London:  C. Hurst & Company, 1975. 
 
Gochenour, D. Thomas. “Towards a Sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen.” In 
Contemporary Yemen:  Politics and Historical Background, ed. B.R. Pridham, 1–
19.  New York, NY:  St. Martin’s Press, 1984. 
 
al-Harazi, Shatha. “Concerns raised over “limited time” to amend legislation before 
Yemeni elections.” Yemen Times (October 18, 2010) 
http://www.yementimes.com/defaultdet.aspx?SUB_ID=34916 (accessed  October 
20, 2010). 
 
Hedgehammer, Thomas. “Global Jihadism after the Iraq War.” Middle East Journal 60, 
no. 1 (Winter 2006):  11–32. 
 
Hill, Ginny. Yemen:  Fear of Failure. Chatham House Publications, UK:  November, 
2008. http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12576_bp1108yemen.pdf (accessed 
20 April 2010). 
 
Johnsen, Gregory D. “The Expansion Strategy of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula.” 




Kasinof, Laura. “Local war in southern Yemen pits government against militants” The 
Christian Science Monitor.  October 18, 2010.  
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/1018/Local-war-in-southern- 
Yemen-pits-government-against-militants (accessed November 10, 2010). 
 
Kostiner, Joseph. The Struggle for South Yemen.  New York, NY:  St. Martin’s, 1984. 
 
Longley-Alley, April.  "The Rules of the Game:  Unpacking Patronage Politics in 
Yemen," The Middle East Journal, 64, no. 3 (Summer, 2010):  385–409. 
 
Mandaville, Jon. “Memduh Pasha and Aziz Bey:  Ottoman Experience in Yemen.” In 
Contemporary Yemen:  Politics and Historical Background, ed. B.R. Pridham, 
20–33.  New York, NY:  St. Martin’s Press, 1984. 
 
Moghadam, Assaf.  The Globalization of Martyrdom:  Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the 
Diffusion of Suicide Attacks.  Baltimore, MD:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2008. 
 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United States.  9/11 Commission 
Report.  Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office, July 22, 2004. 
 
Newman, Edward.  “Weak States, State Failure and Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 19, no.4 (Fall 2007): 463–488 
 
Novak, Jane. “Arabian Peninsula al Qaeda groups merge.” The Long War Journal, 
January 26, 2009.  
http://longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/01/arabian_peninsula_al.php (accessed 
22 September, 2010). 
 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, National Defense Strategy (June, 2008), 3–8. 
http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf 
(accessed October 20, 2010). 
 
Patrick, Stewart.  “Failed’ States and Global Security:  Empirical Questions and Policy 
Dilemmas,” International Studies Review, Vol. 9 (2007), 644–662. 
 
Phillips, Sarah.  Evaluating Political Reform in Yemen.  Washington, D.C.:  Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2007. 
 
———. “What Comes Next in Yemen?  Al Qaeda, the Tribes and State-Building,” 
Yemen:  On the Brink.  Washington, D.C.:  Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, March 2010. 
 
———. Yemen's Democracy Experiment in regional perspective:  Patronage and  
Pluralized Authoritarianism.  New York, NY:  Palgrave MacMillan, 2008. 
 94 
Raghavan, Sudarsan. “From a decade’s missteps, a new threat emerges; Errors by U.S., 
Yemen help al-Qaeda regroup in poor Mideast nation.” The Washington Post.  
January 3, 2010. 
 
Reidel, Bruce and Bilal Y. Saab. “Al Qaeda’s Third Front:  Saudi Arabia.” The 
Washington Quarterly 31, no. 2 (Spring 2008):  33–46. 
 
Salmoni, Barak A., Bryce Loidolt, Madeleine Wells.  Regime and Periphery in Northern 
Yemen.  Santa Monica, CA:  RAND, 2010. 
 
Senate Armed Services Committee.  Statement of General David H. Petraeus before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command.  
March 16, 2010. 
 
Schmitt, Eric and Scott Shane. “Aid to Fight Qaeda in Yemen Divides U.S. Officials.” 
The New York Times.  September 15, 2010. 
 
Schwedler, Jillian.  Faith in Moderation:  Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen.  New 
York, NY:  Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
Stookey, Robert W.  South Yemen:  A Marxist Republic in Arabia.  Boulder, CO:  
Westview Press, 1982. 
 
Stout, Mark E., Jessica M. Huckabey, John R. Schindler, Jim Lacey. The Terrorist   
Perspectives Project:  Strategic and Operational views of Al Qaida and 
Associated Movements. Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 2008. 
 
STRATFOR Global Intelligence. “Yemen:  Al Qaeda’s Resurgence.” April 22, 2008.   
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/yemen_al_qaedas_resurgence (accessed  
September 22, 2010). 
 
U.S. Agency for International Development. USAID Yemen:  2010–2012 Yemen Country 
Strategy.  
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/middle_east/documents/yemen/USAIDYemen201
0- 2012Strategy.pdf (accessed August 22, 2010). 
 
U.S. Congress.  House.  Committee on foreign Affairs. Yemen on the Brink:  Implications 
for U.S. Policy:  Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 
2nd sess., February 3, 2010. 
 
U.S. Department of State. “International Religious Freedom Report 2008.”  





U.S. Department of the Treasury. “United States Designates bin Laden Loyalist.”  
       February 24, 2004. http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1190.htm (accessed  
       September 2, 2010). 
 
U.S. Library of Congress.  Congressional Research Service. The Cost of Iraq,  
       Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy  
       Belasco. Congressional Rep.  RL33110.  Washington:  The Service,  September 2,  
       2010. 
 
U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Security Assistance Reform:   
       ‘Section 1206’ Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino,  
       Congressional Rep. RS22855, Washington:  The Service, June 29, 2010.   
 
U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Yemen:  Background and U.S   
       Relations, by Jeremy Sharp.  Congressional Rep. RL34170, Washington:  The  
       Service, November1, 2010. 
 
Watkins, Eric. “Islamism and Tribalism in Yemen” In Islamic Fundamentalism, ed.  
       Abdel Salam and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, 215–228.  Boulder, CO:  Westview  
       Press, 1996. 
 
Watkins, Eric. “Yemen’s Innovative Approach to the War on Terror.” Terrorism Monitor  
       3, no. 4.  February 23, 2005.        
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=27598 (accessed 20  
       October 2010). 
 
Whitaker, Brian. “National Unity and Democracy in Yemen:  A Marriage of  
       Convenience.” Al-Bab.   http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/artic/bw1.htm (accessed  
       August 19, 2010). 
 
Wickham, Carrie.  Mobilizing Islam:  Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt.   
       New York, NY:  Columbia University Press, 2002. 
 
Wiktorowicz, Quintan.  “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement.” Studies in Conflict &  
       Terrorism 29, no. 3 (April–May 2006):  207-239.  
 
Willis, John M. “Leaving Only Question-marks:  Geographies of Rule in Modern  
       Yemen.” In Counter-Narratives:  History, Contemporary Society, and Politics in  
       Saudi Arabia and Yemen. eds. Madawi Al-Rasheed and Rovert Vitalis, 119–149.   
       Gorndonsville, VA:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 
 
Witty, David M. “A Regular Army in Counterinsurgency Operations:  Egypt in North  
       Yemen, 1962–1967.” The Journal of Military History, 65, no. 2 (April, 2001): 401– 
       439. 
 
 96 
The White House. National Security Strategy.  May, 2010.   
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strate
gy.pdf (accessed October 20, 2010). 
 
The World Bank Group. “Yemen Quarterly Economic Review.” Summer 2010.      
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTYEMEN/News%20and%20Events/227298
47/YEU_Summer2010.pdf (accessed October 15, 2010). 
 
Worth, Robert F. “Yemen Military Besieges Town it Says is a Hide-Out for Dozens of 
Qaeda Militants.” The New York Times.  22 September, 2010. 
 
Zabarah, Mohammed A. “The Yemeni Revolution of 1962 seen as a Social Revolution.” 
In Contemporary Yemen:  Politics and Historical Background, ed. P.R. Prinham, 
76–84.  New York, NY:  St. Martin’s Press, 1984. 
 
al-Zawahiri, Ayman.  Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. July 9, 
2005. 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9862/letter_from_ayman_alzawahiri_to_abu_musa
b_alzarqawi.html (accessed 2 October, 2010). 
 97 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
